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Paper short abstract

This paper reexamines a major mid-1970s crisis in Japan–South Korea relations, arguing it stemmed not from colonial memory but from Cold War realignments. Divergent responses to structural shifts created tensions that were intensified by two high-profile political incidents.

Paper long abstract

After numerous rounds of negotiations, Japan and South Korea finally normalized their relations in 1965. Existing scholarship generally portrays post-1965 bilateral relations as largely conflict-free, aside from occasional disputes over issues of colonial memory, which became major stumbling blocks in the post–Cold War era. This paper challenges that characterization by examining a major crisis in Japan–South Korea relations in the mid-1970s. The crisis was unrelated to Japan`s colonial rule over Korea but was so severe that it prompted direct intervention by the United States. The immediate catalysts for the crisis were two dramatic incidents unrelated to colonial rule: the abduction of South Korean opposition leader Kim Dae-jung from Tokyo by South Korean intelligence agents in August 1973, and the assassination attempt on President Park Chung-hee in August 1974 by a South Korean resident of Japan.

While these events sharply escalated tensions, this paper argues that the roots of the crisis lay in broader structural transformations in the Cold War order in Asia. Focusing on shifts in U.S. strategy under the Nixon administration—including the Guam Doctrine, which placed greater responsibility for regional defence on American allies, the normalization of U.S.–China relations, and détente with the Soviet Union—the paper analyses how these changes altered the strategic environments of Japan and South Korea in divergent ways. It contends that differences in the roles the two countries occupied within the Cold War system produced contrasting perceptions of these structural shifts, generating friction, mistrust, and competing security priorities. These underlying tensions were then intensified by the two high-profile incidents.

By situating the mid-1970s crisis within the context of Cold War realignments, this paper revises prevailing narratives of post-1965 Japan–South Korea relations and highlights the importance of structural factors unrelated to historical memory, in shaping bilateral relations.