Paper short abstract:

This paper examines the concept of ministerial responsibility as described by the Meiji Constitution and set of regulation in force in pre-war Japan. It also aims to analyze the main points of contention argued by constitutional scholars during the interwar period (1918-1940).

Paper long abstract:

The ministers of pre-war Japan were acting as the central organ of executive power since the end of the 19th century. Nevertheless, their roles and powers were enacted by the Constitution of the Empire of Japan (Meiji Constitution) and other regulations in a quite ambiguous way. This research focuses on the issue of ministerial responsibility, which has been underestimated as a cause of political instability until now.

In the first half of this paper, we will quote the Article 55 of the Meiji Constitution: “(1) The respective Ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor, and be responsible for it. (2) All Laws, Imperial Ordinances, and Imperial Rescripts of whatever kind, that relate to the affairs of the State, require the countersignature of a Minister of State.” We will then mention the Ordinance on the organization of the Cabinet 内閣官制 promulgated in December 1889, which stated that the Cabinet was made up of Ministers of State, gave details on the use of the countersignature and on the Cabinet meetings, and specified that ministers without portfolio could also be members of the Cabinet.

Three decades after the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution, many constitutional scholars were still arguing on key points regarding the responsibility of ministers, and how it should be enforced. In the second half of this presentation, we will therefore regard the following main points of contention, and explain the different opinions of famous interwar Japanese scholars like Uesugi Shinkichi, Shimizu Tooru or Minobe Tatsukichi. First, the dichotomy between the status of ‘Minister of State’ 国務大臣 and ‘head of ministry’ 各省大臣. Second, the definitions and relations between the terms of ‘assistance to the Emperor’ 輔弼, ‘responsibility’ 責任, and ‘countersignature’ 副署. Third, the argument regarding which organ the ministers were responsible to. Finally, the divide between collective and individual responsibilities, and what it implied concerning the unity of the Cabinet as an organ. This demonstration will thereby shed light on the multiplicity of interpretations, which may have led to political confusion.