Paper short abstract:

The Japanese government's creation of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategic narrative and its export it to external players, such as the USA, exemplifies Japan's strategic communication prowess and is a vivid sign of the Abe administration's legacy in contemporary Japanese foreign policy.

Paper long abstract:

Abe Shinzō’s Japan has ventured forcefully in government-led strategic communications, defined as “the use of words, actions, images, or symbols to influence the attitudes and opinions of target audiences to shape their behavior in order to advance interests or policies, or to achieve objectives. For the military […] it includes creating conditions that define a desired end-state” (Farwell 2012: 12). Scholars have studied Japan’s recent engagement with public diplomacy, but mostly highlighted its weak spots, including its focus on business promotion, its lack of strategic depth, if not its strident ideological qualities; in short, the scholarly consensus suggests that Japan does not engaged in strategic communications.

This paper suggests that the Abe administration has made good use of its communications leverage, with international and domestic audiences in mind. The government’s budget for information activities more than tripled in 2015 and, far from wasting money away, it targeted institutions close to power, such as the 2019 endowment of a Japan Chair to Trump’s former National Security Advisor at the Hudson Institute, an institution which may also provide the next US Ambassador to Japan. Moreover, Japan’s communication and strategic engagement in the wider Indo-Pacific region have been accompanied by an uptick in diplomatic tours, speeches and economic initiatives: powerful rhetorical, material and symbolic demonstrations -- to target countries, strategic partners and Japanese citizens -- that China and the BRI were not the only games in town. The embedded strategic narratives suggest that Japan and likeminded states are a staying power in the so-called Indo-Pacific.

In fact, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific provides a tangible measure of Japan’s successes and the paper proves how FOIP’s embedded strategic narratives and geographic re-invention have gained currency among research specialists, journalists, and policymakers alike. More importantly, the paper details evidence of the US government’s embrace of the Japan-born concept, as evidenced by the rechristened Indo-Pacific Command and the National Security and Defense Strategies. Preliminary fieldwork in Washington DC ascribes the US embrace of FOIP to the Japanese government’s multipronged engagement with influential think tanks, academic institutions, and the global news media.