Send message to Author

Paper short abstract:

This paper compares the philosophical outlooks of Taisho-era anarchist Kaneko Fumiko and 19th-century German philosopher Max Stirner and argues that the former, through her rebellious activities and defiant acceptance of a death sentence, philosophically transcended the latter’s thought.

Paper long abstract:

Kaneko Fumiko (1903-1926) was an anarchist, nihilist and egoist active during the Taisho period of modern Japan. She had close ties with Korean liberation activists, particularly her partner Park Yeol (1902-1974). Kaneko became implicated in a plot to assassinate members of the imperial family and was eventually sentenced to death, although her sentence was soon commuted to life imprisonment. She died in prison, and the circumstances of her death have yet to be conclusively determined.

Kaneko is an under-researched figure of Japanese history, with most research, both in Japanese and English, focusing primarily on her life and referring to her thought and philosophy only when it is relevant to explain her actions. This is unfortunate, considering Kaneko herself rejected her actions being labelled as simple terrorism but stated that they have a philosophical foundation.

Therefore, this paper focuses primarily on Kaneko’s thought; particularly, it endeavours to explain her thought by referring to the egoist philosophy of Max Stirner (1806-1856), whom Kaneko holds in high esteem and considers her most significant influence. Stirner was the originator of egoism, a philosophy that the individual should be the ultimate authority over oneself and should never compromise one’s pursuit of self-interests.

However, this paper also argues that Kaneko’s thought was not just a carbon copy of Stirner’s philosophy but also deviates from it in some regards. A significant difference is in her utter rejection of expressing remorse and defiant attitude towards the court and interrogators in prison.One may argue that, from Stirner’s perspective, her defiant attitude was non-egoistic since she was actively working against her well-being. In other words, she had been possessed by a single passion and lost control over herself.

Against such a reading, this paper proposes that Kaneko’s defiant attitude, despite her lack of concern for her well-being, reflects fidelity to her innermost desire that is outside the scope of Stirner’s egoism. Kaneko’s fidelity to herself also reveals that Stirner’s egoism, despite its absolutisation of the individual, is inherently a classical Aristotelian ethic because of its emphasis on a balance of passions and desires.