Paper short abstract:

This presentation focuses on the factors that led the Japanese Navy to massacre 100,000 civilians in Manila in February 1945. Using surviving documents of the Imperial Army and Navy, I show that the tragedy in Manila was partially a byproduct of specific battle tactics.

Paper long abstract:

While the Rape of Nanjing is well-studied as one of the worst atrocities of the Japanese Imperial Army during the Second World War, there is relatively scant reserach on the rampage of Imperial Navy troops in Manila (February 1945), one of the biggest massacres in the Pacific War in which 100,000 Filipino civilians were killed by Japanese marines, often after gruesome torture. The existing studies on the massacre usually focus on the subsequent trial of General Yamashita Tomoyuki, Japanese commander in chief of the Philippines, and the doctrine of command responsibility that developed as a result. Other studies deal with the experience of the victims. In this presentation, however, I would like to shift the focus back to the still-obscure decisions that led to the massacre. Using surviving documents of the Imperial Army and Navy, and some new studies, I will show that the tragedy in Manila, unplanned in advance, was at least partly a result of peculiar battle tactics adopted during the fight on Manila.