Paper short abstract:

This paper analyses the Japan Teachers' Union (JTU) by utilizing Interest Group Theory to compare the JTU's case with unions in other liberal democracies. This paper will examine the effect of the exclusion of JTU from power on education reform and the employment rights of teachers in Japan.

Paper long abstract:

Political scientists have applied Interest Group Theory to the study of teachers' unions in a variety of liberal democracies. This paradigm posits that teachers have vested interests in their jobs and have strong incentives to get organized, mobilize resources and exercise power in order to protect and advance their interests. This paper will discuss teachers' unions in Japan in light of this debate, and will explore those features of teachers' unions that are similar to other interest groups and those that are more distinctive. It will also raise for discussion questions about the distinctive nature of Japanese interest group behavior compared to other OECD nations.

During the postwar period, the Japan Teachers Union (JTU) was one of the main pillars of the Left in Japanese politics. However, the failure of the main party of the Left, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) to win power in the Diet meant that the JTU could never turn this influence into direct control over law-making related to education issues or the employment rights of teachers. The collapse of the JSP in the 1990s was accompanied by the rise of a new party of the Left, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Following this party's victory in the 2009 general election, the JTU, for the first time in its history, was able to gain at least some access to national-level policy makers. Unfortunately for the union, the DPJ government lurched from crisis to crisis and was able to get very little done. In 2012 it was defeated and the LDP returned to power.

This frustration of near-permanent opposition marks Japan's main teachers' union as different from teachers' unions in most other OECD countries which can expect to have a more direct effect on education policy-making at least some of the time. Also, the refusal of the Japanese Ministry of Education to negotiate with the JTU (or any other national association representing teachers), means they have no direct say over the setting of pay and conditions. This paper will examine the effect of this situation on education reform and the employment rights of teachers in Japan.