Paper short abstract:

The relationship between society and the individual is central to Tanabe Hajime's philosophy. In this paper, I will explore the logical underpinnings of Tanabe's social theory. Specifically, I will clarify how Tanabe connects the Aristotelian syllogism with our socially informed perceptions.

Paper long abstract:

Tanabe Hajime (田邉元 1885-1962) stands shoulder to shoulder with Nishida Kitarō (西田幾多郎 1870-1945) as a founding figure of the Kyōto School. It is well known that Tanabe focused on the relationship between society and individuals. In this paper, I would like to explore the mechanics, so to speak, of Tanabe's logic that underlie his social theory. Specifically, my goal is to clarify how Tanabe's interpretation of the Aristotelian syllogism functions in his argument that the society we live in holds sway over our simplest perceptions and judgments.

Tanabe arrives at this conclusion by tackling the perennial question of how the objects of cognition relate to the contents thereof. He believes that an answer to this question can be found through an epistemological analysis of the role of judgments in Aristotelian logic. Thus, in a judgment, say, "this table is wooden," the logical subject "this table" corresponds to the object of cognition, whereas the logical predicate "wooden" corresponds to the content of cognition. Thus, he reformulates the epistemological question of cognition with logical notions: i.e. how does the copula "is" relate the subject to the predicate? His novel solution lies in the identification of the copula with the middle term X of a syllogism. Thus, our cognition of a given table is enabled through the form of a syllogism: "this table is X," "X is wooden," "therefore, this table is wooden." The middle term, which mediates the major and minor premises, is transformed into the copula of the concluding judgement.

Tanabe conceives this implicit middle term as the social and historical burden that forms our perceptual content. This term, which develops in the history of a society, forces itself into our perception in the form of customs. In other words, Tanabe insists that, although it does not appear in the content of our cognition, it nevertheless mediates the world and our thoughts. His conclusion can be stated as follows: what we take to be spontaneously thought is actually a manifestation of social customs.