Paper short abstract:

Recently, Japan changed its civilian control mechanism inside the MOD in several ways. The antagonism between civil bureaucrats and uniformed members of the Self-Defense Forces was replaced by a new system aiming at unity, effectiveness and political leadership in a severe security environment.

Paper long abstract:

Japan's civil-military relations have been unique among democratic states for various reasons. In the wake of WWII, a system of civilian control was created that assigned the control of the armed forces, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), to civilians, albeit non-elected bureaucrats rather than politicians. This system was called 'bunkan tōsei' or bureaucratic control of the armed forces, and also reflected Japan's post war security policy trajectory.

In 2007, the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) was upgraded to full ministerial status, but this was only the visible start of reforms that culminated in the institutional change of civilian control in Japan. Over the course of a few years, critical elements of the former system were dissolved. For example, the 'defense councilor' system (bureaucratic elites in charge of the internal bureaus), which hailed back to the creation of the JDA and has been the mainstay of bureaucratic influence, was abolished. Other important changes followed. Today, the uniformed members of the JSDF are much more influential inside the Ministry of Defense, thus affecting national security and defense policy-making.

The English and Japanese language literature on Japan's changing security policy has neglected issues of civilian control and lacks a close scrutiny of this subject. This essay fills that gap and argues that the incentives for reform were rooted in different configurations of the security environment and unit-level factors, such as domestic politics. Specifically, with the end of the Cold War, Japan faced a security environment marked by heightened uncertainty and unpredictability. Entering the 2000's, uncertainty was slowly replaced with more evident threats from North Korea and China. The nature and quality of security challenges and threats therefore have changed over time and created a different motivation for reform. Thus, the change of civilian control was initially aimed at creating a framework for overseas operations such as Peace Keeping Operations (PKO), but later aimed at coping with emerging threats. This process further increased the leverage of uniformed members in the decision-making process.