Send message to Author

Paper long abstract

Research on social protection in the informal economy has largely prioritised state-led interventions or material support mechanisms, often overlooking everyday financial practices through which informal workers organise security and manage risk. In Ghana, susu, a rotating savings and credit arrangement remains a central but under-theorised institution within informal markets.

Using a qualitative methodology, this study draws on in-depth interviews with 55 food traders to examine the moral economy underpinning susu practices at the Madina Market in Accra, Ghana. It analyses how these arrangements function as informal systems of collective risk pooling and social protection, exploring traders’ accounts of participation in susu, obligations of contribution, enforcement mechanisms, and meanings attached to trust, reciprocity, and discipline.

The findings reveal that susu operates as a robust social safety net governed by disciplined reciprocity, providing essential social protection for participants. There are primarily two typologies of susu, playing complementary roles. The Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA), a group-based model where members periodically contribute to a common pool distributed in rotation while the individual or personal susu, more prevalent among traders, involves a one-on-one relationship with a susu collector.

Beyond its financial function, susu is embedded in a moral economy shaped by trust, reputation, and shared responsibility, offering predictability and assurance in contexts marked by income volatility and limited formal protection. The study contributes to social protection theory by foregrounding informal finance as a moral-economic institution, calling for a greater analytical attention to collective, trust-based mechanisms in understanding protection beyond formal insurance models.