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Paper short abstract

This study shows how political dynamics—rather than access constraints alone—shape inequitable humanitarian aid distribution in Myanmar, undermining local legitimacy and worsening conflict, and proposes feasible measures to correct structural aid disparities.

Paper long abstract

Humanitarian aid in armed conflicts is often seen to be unevenly distributed because of access constraints or the challenges of delivering assistance to dangerous areas. Recent initiatives have emphasized the localization of aid and the diversification of implementing actors to overcome such constraints. Yet these reforms remain limited in many conflict settings. This study argues that the central barrier is not merely technical or logistical, but political: the flow and reach of aid are significantly shaped by political decision-making.

Using the case of Myanmar, the analysis demonstrates how political intervention produces inequities in aid distribution, even in areas with clear needs. These allocation dynamics deepen divisions among communities and organizations and reshape the broader conflict structure. Such outcomes violate the Do No Harm principle widely shared across humanitarian and development fields, revealing that external assistance can generate unintended conflict consequences.

This study presents two empirical cases: (1) the dominance of UN agencies in channeling Japanese aid, which restricts assistance from reaching affected populations, and (2) the selection of local partners without attention to historical context, resulting in skewed support and community exclusion.

The study concludes by proposing two feasible improvements: redesigning aid routes that do not require UN agencies as mandatory intermediaries, and selecting implementing partners based on historical context and organizational legitimacy. These measures are essential to reduce structural inequities and ensure aid reaches those most in need.