Contribution short abstract:

Can rural lower classes ensure their political and economic interests through regime type changes? A case of rural class struggle suggests that popular counter-power may be of greater important to democratic and developmental politics than formal distinctions between democracy and authoritarianism.

Contribution long abstract:

How can rural lower classes ensure their political and economic interests despite changes in regime type? The relationship between agrarian policy and regime types has long been a key topic in development politics. Scholars argue that landed elites prefer dictatorships to protect property rights and ensure cheap labor. Yet, recently, elites have accepted democratization as property rights are safeguarded or mechanization reduces reliance on labor control. Regardless, rural lower classes suffer from landlessness, poor employment, and political marginalization, prompting a rethinking of democracy’s purpose. This study examines a puzzling case in northern Pakistan, where a transition from democracy to a military regime, backed by landed elites, saw peasants retain economic gains. I argue that power shifts did not align neatly with regime changes but depended on what each regime deemed effective, given the balance between elites and armed peasant movements. Both military and civilian regimes upheld elite autonomy when useful for controlling peasants. However, where peasant counter-power challenged elite dominance, regimes adopted similar techniques of consent and coercion. The paper rethinks distinctions between democratic and authoritarian regimes by highlighting popular counter-power as central to democratic and developmental politics.