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Paper short abstract:

This article explores the political economy reasons behind India’s continued fossil energy expansion using the Deucha Pachami coal mine in West Bengal as entry point. Despite coal's high cost and surplus electricity, the state government pursues a questionable fossil project in lack of other income.

Paper long abstract:

Based on the assertion that the world needs to drastically cut its fossil energy use, this article explores the federal political economy reasons behind continued fossil energy expansions in India. It does so by examining state government support for the peculiar Deucha Pachami coal mine in West Bengal state – peculiar not only since coal energy is more expensive than renewable energy, not only due to the history of prominent land struggles against displacement within the state, but also due to the very expensive coal that will be produced from this deep mine in a state which does not need more electricity. To explore what we term fossil developmentalism of last resort, we combine literature on energy geographies and India’s federal political economy to seek explanations for continued federal state government support for coal energy also for seemingly unattractive projects like the Deucha Pachami coal mine. Empirically, we draw on activist reports, political debates within the state and official documents including mine planning documents. Tentative conclusions indicate that state-level coal mining support relates to the lack of alternative income-generating avenues as India’s federal political economy increasingly centralises power and financial resources to the national government. In such a setting state governments may seek to develop also financially (and environmentally) questionable fossil energy projects in order to improve their ability to compensate key electoral groups.