Paper short abstract:

This paper examines how Members of Parliament constitute a policy feedback mechanism for agricultural input subsidies (AIS) in Malawi and Zambia. Despite having mostly negative views on AIS, MPs strongly advocate for AIS in their constituencies, in the process reinforcing its political importance.

Paper long abstract:

Recent literature has offered explanations how different political settlements can explain the adoption/implementation of social policies (e.g. Hickey et al, 2020). Though few have focused on how social policies can reproduce the political settlement. Policies can create feedback mechanisms to reinforce the policy itself and shape the political context, by for instance creating vested interests, or influencing cognitive frames on the ‘right’ policy (Campbell 2012; Weible & Sabatier, 2018).

This paper investigates the role of Members of Parliament (MPs) in upholding agricultural input subsidies (AIS) in Malawi and Zambia, based on 6 months of qualitative interviews with politicians, civil servants, donor officials, and others. Despite high costs of AIS and limited effects on yields, AIS produce significant political feedback mechanisms, because they are seen as crucial to winning elections, and a significant source for rent-seeking.

MPs, I argue, are wrapped up in another feedback mechanism. Despite most of them having negative views on AIS overall, and despite having only limited influence over implementation in practice, they see achieving results on AIS as one of the major requirements for political support from their constituents. They go to great lengths to lobby on the national level, to ensure implementation in their constituencies at high personal costs, and to be seen while doing it. In doing so, they create heavy competition amongst MPs, they place constant pressure on the executive to spend more on AIS, but also reinforce the frame that AIS is the main political ‘prize’ that constituents can hope for.