Paper short abstract:

A retrospective comparison of illicit crop prices before and after certain historical turning points in Bolivia, Myanmar, Colombia, and Afghanistan.

Paper long abstract:

It has long been argued that markets are self-correcting, self-regulating, and self-sustaining in terms of what to produce, what to charge, and how to organise distribution. But stand-alone price analysis of illicit opium and coca does not explain why smallholders turn to illicit crops for coping and survival. This paper examines conditions of precarity, within which illicit crop markets can stimulate productivity and generate returns that can tame crises and relieve pressures. To smallholders facing marginalisation, violence, and climate change – growing opium and coca, despite their illegality, can reduce or spread risks and provide more predictability. Thus, rather than fix on the ‘invisible hand’ of price theory, the focus should be on the ‘visible hand’ of political entrepreneurship, interdependent relationships, and the metrics of precarity. To do this, this paper retrospectively compares illicit crop prices before and after certain historical moments in Bolivia, Myanmar, Colombia, and Afghanistan.