This paper uses research from Pakistan to propose a theory of ‘isomorphic activism’ that describes how elites appropriate opportunities to participate in public politics supported by development programmes and, in the process, strengthen antidemocratic networks.
Paper long abstract:
This paper uses research from Pakistan to argue that contemporary notions of elite capture are inadequate for exploring how social accountability programmes can fail to contribute to democratising projects in societies structured by patronage relationships. Instead, I propose a theory of ‘isomorphic activism’ that describes how elites appropriate opportunities to participate in public politics and, in the process, strengthen antidemocratic networks. This is facilitated by programmes that are based on ideals of civil society that render activism a technical exercise, depoliticising it and blinding donors to how power inequalities enable the activities they support. The challenges the paper highlights are important given calls for development programmes to change by whom and how politics is done, whilst granting local ownership to participants, quantitively reporting their results and demonstrating value for money. They should also be of interest to those concerned by the spread of market-principles within donor organisations’ ways of working with civil society, and how they are welcomed, appropriated, or simply ignored on the ground.