Paper short abstract:

Chiefs illegally mediate access to mineralized lands in response to post-colonial mineral institutions that supplanted customary institutions over resource governance. However, the social capital that chiefs broadly enjoy shields them and their clients (illegal miners) against law enforcement.

Paper long abstract:

This paper aims to unravel the puzzle of why chiefs in Ghana illegally mediate access to mineralized lands and how they get away with it. It does so by drawing upon historical data, published works and triangulated interview data. The paper argues that the engrained interests of chiefs in illegally mediating access to mineralized lands is emblematic of chiefly endeavour to reassert customary authority over the governance of mineral resources. Customary institutions regarding resource governance, which were partially respected by colonial structures, got obliterated by the succeeding post-colonial resource governance structures, providing a fundamental motivation for chiefs to illegally facilitate access to mineralized lands. Nonetheless, the embeddedness of chiefs in the Ghanaian society and the social capital associated with the institution of chieftaincy constitute major bargaining chips through which chiefs and their clients (illegal miners) evade mining-related law enforcement. This argument underscores how the constraining effect of institutions on human interaction can be counterproductive, particularly when ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ institutions compete over the organization of society. The paper, therefore, contributes to a gamut of formal and informal literature on institutions and the broader debate on chieftaincy and development in Africa.