Paper short abstract:

This paper evaluates the uses of colonial history in new institutional economics of Douglass North, Acemoglu, Robinson etc. The paper argues that colonial history is misrepresented and this has significant implications for understanding the role of violence in development.

Paper long abstract:

The objective of this paper is to explore the different ways colonial history has been interpreted by New Institutional Economics (NIE). NIE has been very influential in shaping understanding of contemporary development across a range of disciplines and policy spheres. NIE originates from the work of Douglass North and more recently has been popularized by Acemoglu, Robinson, Johnston and others. While the original NIE models focussed on individual bargaining as the driving force behind institutional change, recent models engage more explicitly with violence and power. Despite placing history at the heart of their theoretical model, these approaches have a problematic engagement with colonial history. North's last work on Access Orders frames development as a process of moving from limited access to open access orders as institutions emerge to control violence. However the framework ignores colonial violence and the interaction between open and limited access orders. In contrast, Acemoglu et al place colonialism as central to understanding development. However, their approach is also unsatisfactory. Once again, the role of colonial violence in establishing institutions is underplayed. The paper argues that this leads to misinterpretation of the contemporary relationship between institutional and economic change. This is demonstrated in the paper though an exploration of the interpretation of a number of case studies in the literature.