Paper short abstract:

This paper uses the case of Uganda's informal security sector, with an emphasis on Crime Preventers, to illustrate the mutually reinforcing relationship between Uganda's militarized neo-patrimonial system and youth employment insecurity.

Paper long abstract:

Before Uganda's 2016 elections, the government recruited thousands of "Crime Preventers"—mostly unemployed male youths—ostensibly to bolster security during the electoral season. Many claimed that Crime Preventers would be used "as tools" to rig the elections, intimidate voters, and vote en masse for the ruling NRM regime. In contrast, this paper shows that the government never intended the crime preventers to play an explicitly coercive role. Instead, the program represents an important dimension of how Uganda's militarized neo-patrimonial regime manages a vast population of unemployed and dissatisfied youths that makes up a significant part of Uganda's electorate. In creating a new security program with no barriers to entry, the NRM effectively extended its neo-patrimonial machine to placate a constituency that otherwise felt neglected by the government, and thus was prone to support the opposition. The program attracted unemployed youth through three main pathways: first, a widespread social stigma against idling; second, the promise of short-, medium-, and long-term economic rewards; and third, an opportunity to develop social networks, which can help with coping and "social navigation" (Vigh 2009). Thus, the program functioned primarily as a short-term extension of patrimonialism targeting unemployed youths, in contrast to the oft-emphasized framing of a political militia.