Paper short abstract:

This paper first compares the securitisation of UK aid provision to Ethiopia and the CAR in an effort to uncover reasons underlying the relatively greater securitisation of aid committed to Ethiopia and second reflects on possible consequences of such aid provision.

Paper long abstract:

Since mid-1990s, but particularly following 9/11, the policy discourse of Western donors has grown increasingly securitised; i.e. donors have begun to draw ever greater connections between the lack of development and security in the global South and threats to peace and stability in the global North. The route via which aid was envisaged to help in this matter was through increased investment in the government and civil society sectors of fragile and conflict-affected countries. Petrikova and Lazell (2016) showed, however, that the rhetorical commitments have not actually translated into more aid provided to the government and civil society sectors in general but only to specifically conflict-related activities such as the strengthening of the security sector or disarmament and demobilisation. Aid was hence found not to be 'securitised' per se, but rather 'militarised.'

This article explores the militarisation of British aid in more detail through a comparative case study of Ethiopia and Central African Republic (CAR). The two countries lie close to each other geographically and have both suffered from political instability for decades - yet the UK has invested an increasing amount of resources in the conflict, peace, and security sectors in Ethiopia and virtually none in the CAR. I investigate why this has been the case.