Paper short abstract:

Conflict alters everyday economic incentives and drives institutional change. This paper explores these phenomena through the lens of real estate markets and property rights institutions in eastern Congo's urban areas, drawing from historical institutionalist theories of political development.

Paper long abstract:

Conflict alters everyday economic incentives and drives institutional change in cities. This paper explores these phenomena through the lens of real estate markets and property rights institutions in eastern Congo's urban areas. These cities have experienced dramatic demographic growth and spatial expansion over the past two decades of instability and warfare. Conflict-induced urbanization has rendered the regions' property markets increasingly lucrative and, consequently, produced speculation and competition among private sector actors vying for ownership of urban land. New institutions, or, "rules of the game," are layered over prior ones as state and non-state governing authorities attempt to manage an increasingly valuable and capitalized asset. This paper draws from empirical data gathered in Beni and Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo, to explore cases of institutional change. In the first case, formal property rights institutions are layered on top of customary institutions, while in the latter case a neo-customary institution, the Baraza Intercommunautaire, is foisted upon extant state institutions to produce a de facto land management system. Drawing from historical institutionalist notions of path dependence, this paper concludes that everyday institutions that emerge in periods of conflict-urbanization are capable of sustaining long-range impacts on urban development and governance.