

Old and new relations between Brazil-Japan and Triangular Cooperation: The case of ProSAVANA

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Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has operated in Brazil for over fifty years. In this period, Brazil and Japan have developed dozens of bilateral cooperation projects and also entered in the arena of Triangular Cooperation (TrC) in the 1980s. One such example is the ProSAVANA program, a partnership between Brazil, Japan and Mozambique for agricultural development of the mozambican savannah, the biggest initiative between both countries in terms of time horizon (20 years) and budget. ProSAVANA was established in 2009 and can be considered an outspread of cooperation experience between Japan and Brazil that made the Brazilian *cerrado* region a productive one in the 1970's.

An analysis of ProSAVANA can reveal some characteristics of the relationship between "emerging" and "traditional donors" and how these relations impact the agenda of development cooperation. Thus, we seek to observe how cooperation between Brazil and Japan has developed in ProSAVANA, focusing on aspects of the North-South relationship.

The first section is dedicated to introduce the cooperation Brazil-Japan as part of a friendly relationship developed since 1895, in which cooperation for development plays an important role. To introduce Triangular Cooperation there is a second section presenting a definition of TrC, North-South Cooperation (NSC) and South-South Cooperation (SSC). In the third section the focus is the TrC between Japan and Brazil, including the main frameworks constructed and the main areas of experiences replication in third countries. Finally, the last section has as objective the analysis of Japan-Brazil relations in the ProSAVANA, involving Mozambique, and will introduce what constitutes the program. This section will present a discussion focusing on aspects of what is called "North-South" relationship, looking for the contributions can be done for the changing paradigms of international development cooperation.

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1. Cooperation Brazil-Japan: a friendly relationship

In 2009 cooperation between Brazil and Japan completed fifty years. Because of that, in 2010 JICA published a document entitled: “*50 anos de cooperação Brasil-Japão*” (“Fifty years of cooperation Brasil-Japão”). In this document, the message left by the then director of the Brazilian agency of cooperation (ABC in Portuguese), Marco Farani, put focus on the contributions that Japan has made to many areas in human resources, like “institutional capacity building, agricultural research and industry”². In the same document, then Japanese ambassador, Ken Shimanouchi, highlighted the traditional relationship between Brazil and Japan and the historic economic cooperation, that includes sending experts to Brazil, training and official development assistance, besides concessional loans. Those messages (and the proper document) are just a little prove about the friendly relationship Japan and Brazil have developed since 1895, with the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. Since the establishment of this relationship, there were periods of great enthusiasm and others of low dynamism, imbued of mutual interest. In this sense, Uehara (2013) critics the “inertial profile” of Brazilian-Japanese relations, that depends also of a favorable scenario.

According to Cavalcante (2015:16) Japan-Brazil relationship is characterized by an “intermittent interaction” (“*interação intermitente*”). She also pointed that during and after the Cold War Japan remained “as a constant and complementary partner to Brazilian interests”³ economically and politically, due to necessity of reducing the dependency towards China and United States. The main aspects of this relationship covered by the literature have been: development cooperation, investments and trade. These three aspects, without a clear frontier among them, that have oriented the relationship after the 1950s.

Japanese official development assistance (ODA) have played an important role in this relationship. It has happened not only related to Brazil but it has been a relevant aspect of Japanese international relations in general after the World War II, in special because of the abdication of Japanese government

² “aperfeiçoamento institucional, pesquisa agrícola e industrial” (JICA, 2009)

³ Translated freely from the original in portuguese: “como um parceiro constante e complementar aos interesses brasileiros” (CAVALCANTE, 2015:16).

of military power (LANCASTER, 2009; UEHARA, 2013). With reductions in trade and investment of Japan in Brazil it has given still more emphasis in Technical and Triangular Cooperation.

Japanese-Brazilian studies have started with the arrival of Japanese immigrants in 1908. In this phase, Brazilian and Japanese were respectively interested in workforce and in the expansion and modernization of their country. With the World War II, they had their relations interrupted but they were reestablished in 1952, with United States withdrawal of Japan (LEITE and DANTAS, 2013).

Initially Brazil had supported Japan after World War II, providing food and medicines, sending by “Suprimentos LARA” (Licensed Agencies to Aid in Asia). Besides, the country participated the joint proposal of 34 countries for the return of Japan to United Nations, in 1956 (JICA, 2010). Japan also received assistance from other countries, and loans from international agencies like World Bank. In spite of that, even before finishing the payments of its loans, Japan started to promote international assistance for development for its own (MOCHIZUKI, 2009).

In this context, Brazil was one of the firsts in receiving Japanese loans (in 1961) during a period Japanese ODA was focused just on Asian countries. About technical cooperation, in 1959 Japan sent an expert in irrigation to Brazil and one year after seven Brazilian experts were sent to Japan for a training program (JICA, 2009). The main cooperation areas (until 1970s) were agriculture and mining. This period was characterized by the Brazilian search for capital and technology for industrialization (LEITE and DANTAS, 2013).

Before this expansion to ODA, investment and trade and especially before the 1950s, Japan-Brazil relationship had been focused only in the immigrant community (CAVALCANTE, 2015). Until now, the most part of the studies has developed in Brazil about Japan-Brazil relations are about migration, another relevant aspect of these relations. The major Japanese community in the world is in Brazil (60% of descending that live abroad) (UEHARA, 2008).

In 1970s, oil crises and food insecurity had strong impact on Japan, causing a grain production crises. Because of this, the country was looking for resources and food, while Brazil was passing by a good moment in economics, with a big potential market. That period, of complementary interests, was the

“golden era” of consolidation of Brazil-Japan cooperation. It was also in this decade they signed the “Basic Agreement on Technical cooperation” and Joint strategic projects for resources development⁴ (JICA, 2009). Still in the 1970s ODA from Japan to Brazil has started to be focused on technical cooperation. It was in this context that a JICA office was opened in Brazil in 1976, as an annex of Japan embassy in Brasilia. Today JICA has two offices in the country, one for cooperation and another to Nikkei community (DANTAS, 2013). This kind of cooperation from Japan to Brazil has raised constantly from 1980 and 1995, reaching US\$ 66,96 millions in 1995 (UEHARA, 2008).

Otherwise, in the 1970s there was a reduction of ODA volume from Japan to Brazil but there was an increasing to other countries in Latin America (UEHARA, 2008). Despite of this, Brazil already has a prominent position among Latin American countries in Japan ODA, being today the second largest receptor in Latin America (IFIC, 2002). Meanwhile, Japan was the main donor to Brazil from 1970s until 2004, when Germany took its position (UEHARA, 2008 with data from OECD).

In that decade, not just Japan-Brazil cooperation was consolidated but Japanese development assistance was consolidated as foreign policy instrument to all over the world, with Japan becoming the major donor of the world in 1989. In this period, the participation of Japanese ODA in total DAC/OECD members ODA went from 4% (1961-1971) to 9,9% (1971-1980) (UEHARA, 2008).

The 1990s represented a decade of ODA Japan-Brazil instability, but there was a return of the intensification in the relationship in the second half of the decade, except by the investments that had fallen in the 1980s and didn't recovered in the 1990s (JICA, 2010; CAVALCANTE, 2015). Reduction of inequalities and environment protection were included in this agenda of cooperation, with the promotion, together with EMBRAPA, of the agroforestry system⁵ and loans to environmental projects, as the recovery of Tiete River in

⁴ One of these projects was the “Steel Mills of Minas Gerais” (“Usinas Siderúrgicas de Minas Gerais” - USIMINAS), a Brazilian-Japanese joint venture. Another one was the “Celulose Nipo-Brasileira S.A” (CENIBRA), for production of paper, aiming at utilization of entire capacity and recycling of forestry resources. And finally, two related examples are “Alumínio Brasileiro S.A.” (ALBRAS) and “Alumina do Norte do Brasil S.A” (ALUNORTE), respectively to processing and production of aluminum in Amazonia (JICA, 2010).

⁵ This system was created by Japanese immigrants in Amazonia, consisting on the inclusion of trees mixed with the crops, including a mix of different tropical crops.

São Paulo and sewage treatment and depollution of Guanabara Bay (JICA, 2010).

Today Brazil constitutes for Japan an “important global partner” (“importante parceiro global”) because of its leadership in the international scenario (JICA, 2009:8). In 2000 both signed the Japan-Brazil Partnership Program (JBPP), aiming at expansion of their TrC and in 2004 both, together with Germany and Índia, started the G4, a group that demand jointly a permanent sit on Security Council of United Nations, two images of this partnership (CAVALCANTE, 2015).

In the last years ODA from Japan to Brazil and bilateral trade has decreased relatively, but it is happening in a context of general decrease of Japanese budget and, consequently of Japanese ODA (IFIC, 2002). In spite of this, for Uehara (2013), one of the motives can be the perception Brazil does not need a lot of assistance anymore. On the other side, it can be seen a salience of triangular projects/programs, showing that the decreasing of ODA doesn't mean lack of importance of Brazil to Japanese foreign policy.

Another evidence can corroborate this idea is a document about “Country assistance evaluation of Brazil” with respect to 2009, published in 2010 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA). Among the main recommendations presented in the document are showing the importance of the country to Japan continuing the ODA for a period of time and TrC. Besides, Brazil occupies a very good position in Japanese ODA: the 1th non-Asian among the top 20 in 2006 and the 5th bilateral cooperation receiver in 2009 and 2010 (LEITE and DANTAS, 2013). What means also Brazil remains a large receiver, showing an unequal relationship.

Also in recent years, science and technology cooperation to solve global problems has gained more prominence in the agenda. One example is the “Science and technology research partnership for sustainable development”, signed in 2008. The first project in this area has started in 2009, in ethanol production (JICA, 2009). This inclusion looks to contribute with the tendency towards technical and TrC.

According to Ken Shimanouchi Japan-Brazil agenda of cooperation in 21th century has been characterized by the attention to new challenges in global scale, like climate change and food security, as well as strengthen of TrC (JICA, 2009).

In technical cooperation the priorities are: agriculture, environment, industry, health and social development (MOFA, 2010; LEITE and DANTAS, 2013). In this context is located ProSAVANA, listed by JICA (2009) as one of the examples of Japan-Brazil actions against global problems⁶.

One of the questions raised with the prominence of South-South Cooperation (SSC) on Brazilian foreign policy in the last fifteen years was if relations with Japan remained relevant to Brazil. This question was raised by Aline Dantas (2013) and her conclusion was that relations with Japan remain important to Brazil, since they do not harm SSC. For her, Brazilian foreign policy can be enhanced by the development and diversification of partners like the relationship with Japan. Besides, traditional relations have been remodeled to emphasize the “partnership” element. According to Lessa (*apud*. DANTAS, 2013), 2005 was the year of a new impulse to Brazil-Japan bilateral agenda, when Japan appears again among strategic priorities of Brazilian foreign policy. For Dantas (2013), by the means of TrC, Japan is doing part of SSC.

Finally, Brazil have occupied during most part of this relationship a receiver position, what can remembers ODA not only signifies aid but it is also a political (as well as economic and diplomatic) instrument, due to the reasons other countries have to give that aid to Brazil. In MOFA (2010), for example, it is clear that TrC and remaining ODA from Japan to Brazil have multiple motivations, as the position Brazil have occupied politically and economically in the world, its potential as emerging donor, availability of food and natural resources and a big Japanese community.

2. Triangular cooperation and the dialog between North-South and South-South cooperation.

TrC to JICA (2014 *apud* CAVALCANTE, 2015) is: “the implementation of cooperation programs by donor countries or international aid organizations, jointly with other developing countries, aimed at the further development of other developing countries”. ABC (2012) defines TrC as an SSC modality by the means

⁶ Another examples listed are: monitoring Amazonia from the space, estimating the carbon variation in Amazonia, ethanol production from sugarcane bagasse, promotion of international training in “opportunistic infections”.

of two countries or one country and an international organization cooperate to promote development in a third developing country. To ABC, TrC has to contain the follow elements: demand-driven, no conditionality and transfer of good practices. But there is no consensus about TrC definition among academics and practioners, neither just one model of TrC (FINGERMANN, 2014).

The framework for TrC has been created since the 1970s, with contribution of UNDP (Nomura Research Institute Ltd., 2013). In recent years, the growing role TrC have occupied in international development cooperation (IDC) looks like a complementary phenomenon to the decreasing tendency of DAC contributions while participation of BRIC's and other emerging markets has been growing in total of IDC. In this context, countries like Brazil and Japan has given emphasis to this arrangement that, in the future, could play a protagonist role in changes IDC have passed through (PINO, 2013).

The changes in IDC landscape dates to the end of Cold War and, according to Pino (2013), are composed by the existence of new agents (new donors and non-state actors), new financing tools and new arrangements in IDC. With those changes, human development and capacity building have been the main themes and IDC has also incorporated new themes, instruments and mechanisms for coordination and effectiveness. However, the foreign aid paradigm constructed from these changes has failed in the accomplishment of Millenium Development Goals (MDG), what generates skepticism related to international aid (MCEWAN AND MAWDSLEY, 2012). In this scenario the long debate between North-South cooperation (between one developed and one developing country) (NSC) and South-South Cooperation (between developing countries) became stronger.

NSC was borned after World War II in the context of reconstruction of European and Asian countries. Since then, this framework passed through a lot of transformations in the development conceptualization, on ideas of what should be done to reach this objective and in the scope (in terms of themes and geography). The number of countries which have provide foreign aid grew and an architecture has shaped around these we called today "traditional donors", countries compose today the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) from OECD.

In this architecture there are few formal rules and a lot of expectations and principles based on “soft agreements”. The current foreign aid paradigm has focused on “good governance”⁷. The “aid effectiveness paradigm”, formulated with high level meetings about aid effectiveness (Rome (2003), Paris (2005), Accra (2008) and Busan (2011)) has two main elements: more ownership of the beneficiaries because of development strategies and global compromise with tangible results. In this sense, it seeks to overcome problems have brought by critics as: poor coordination, top-down cooperation, connection with donors interests, excess of transaction costs and insufficient monitoring (MAWDSLEY, 2012).

Despite of the existence of a paradigm, traditional donors are very different from one to another and Japan is one of the examples, as exposed by Lancaster (2009). Japan tries by the means of foreign aid export their good practices in culture and politics (CHICHAVA and DURÁN, 2016). Its aid has emphasis on the role State plays in the economy, different of other traditional donors and the way to development defended by Japan is composed by the development of economic and key-industries infrastructure, plus support to social sector (RAPOSO and POTTER, 2010 apud CAVALCANTE, 2015).

As well as NSC, SSC programs and projects are also heterogeneous initiatives held by heterogeneous countries. Even just the case of Brazil presents a lot of different initiatives (CESARINO, 2015). In spite of that, there is an attempt to homogenization of cultures, problems and power among these countries (CHISHOLM, 2009). The narratives about SSC were constructed putting them in opposition to north assistance, another attempting of homogenization, considering that not every SSC initiative adopts a position “against” “traditional donors”.

The origin of SSC dates from non-aligned movement, whose inflection point was Bandung Conference in 1955. From that moment to today, there were periods of major activities and periods of less coordination among developing countries. In recent years, SSC reemerges with the emerging economies, like Brazil and China (PINO, 2013). For Cesarino (2015:7): “(...) contemporary south-

⁷ Good governance here is defined by Mawdsley (2012) as an effective work in partnership with private sector and civil society, with strong and responsible institutions, free press and multiparty democracy.

south cooperation is partly built on a claim of failure of the universal development project championed by the global north since Truman's times"⁸. This kind of cooperation appears like an alternative to NSC and principles have been attributable to it are: horizontality, non-conditionality, demand-driven and sharing of good practices (CHICHAHA and DURÁN, 2016). There is no doubt SSC modifies "traditional dynamics" of cooperation, however, questions arises about how far goes the changes in terms of assumptions, attitudes and power (PINO, 2013:14; WOODS, 2011 apud MCEWAN AND MAWDSLEY, 2012).

The dialog between SSC and NSC have had a new impulse with 21th century, including the Heilingendamm Process Final Report⁹ and growing TrC initiatives. The most common kind of TrC is the arrangement including a developed country and two developing countries (North-South-South) but it is possible to find arrangements South-South-South and arrangements including an international organization too (PINO, 2013). Agriculture and other areas related with knowledge of emerging donors and demands of less developed are the most common in TrC (CHICHAHA AND DURÁN, 2016). In the context of this new impulse of dialog, SSC looks been appropriated as a tool, even by northern countries, by the means of TrC. One of this countries is Japan (CHISHOLM, 2009).

There is just few empirical studies about relationship between traditional and emerging donors in TrC. Some authors like McEwan and Mawdsley (2012) and Fingermann (2014) argue that TrC generates a de-politicization in development and in the IDC. Otherwise, Pino (2013) has a more positive view, stating that this arrangement can improve frameworks and other arrangements and make development easier. Although, for him the importance in analyzing TrC is not in the number of partners but in the type and quality of the relationship among the partners.

The factors used to observe type and quality, by Pino (2013), could include responsibilities division, cost sharing, mechanisms of complementarity, mechanisms of knowledge exchange, receptor demands, and reciprocity. One

⁸ The reference to Truman is because Truman's "Point Four Program", launched in 1949 referenced as the mark point of the development cooperation birth (CESARINO, 2015).

⁹ Heilingendamm process is a complementary process to Outreach 5, or G8+5. Both are processes aiming at institutionalization of the dialog among G8 countries and other five emergente countries (China, Brazil, India, Mexico and South Africa) (ICTSD, 2008).

important thing to pay attention in this relationship is that together with the funds and knowledge brought, there are also procedures and work culture of bilateral agencies of traditional donors. Because of it, is important develop more empirical studies to discover more information about the implications of this arrangement to cooperation theories and practices.

In theory TrC is a mean of mix the advantages of the SSC with the advantages of the NSC, but it has also some problems and disadvantages, like: “difficulties in aligning legal frameworks, budgeting and procurement procedures, sectoral priorities, reporting criteria, management structures, monitoring goals and frameworks, as well as the availability of appropriately trained staff” (MCEWAN AND MAWDSLEY, 2012:1195). Another problems raised by McEwan and Mawdsley (2012) are the bigger consumption of time and resources are spending in this arrangement, because of the establishment of procedures and policy guides, and the risk of disconnection of beneficiaries development objectives.

Besides the problems, the question of the impact of TrC in the development cooperation discourses and practices is the other main topic if the theme. In this sense, TrC is partly a response to the rise of new donors and also shows changes is its own position, that previously looked differentiation in relation to NSC. This apparently contradiction (NSC and SSC working together) hides a many nuances have not been discovered yet. In the fourth section we will try to do some advance towards the knowledge about the relationship between traditional and new donors.

3. Brazil-Japan Triangular Cooperation: an analysis of the replication experiences of the Brazil-Japan cooperation in third countries

According to Cavalcante (2015) TrC has been important in foreign policy of both Brazil and Japan, as well as, to relationship between them. In this regard, Sakaguchi (2012) establishes four phases to Brazilian-Japanese TrC: 1) from 1985 (signature of Third Countries Training Program) to March 2000 (signature of JBPP); 2) from March 2000 to April 2007 (Celso Amorim and Sadako Ogata

meeting¹⁰); 3) from April 2007 to June 2010 (launching of the “Japan-Brazil Global partnership for solution of global issues”), and 4) from June 2010 onwards.

In 1985 Brazil and Japan signed the TCTP (“Third Countries Training Program”) aiming at transferring the knowledge had been acquired and adapted initially in ODA projects Japan and Brazil have promoted (JICA, 2009). The main areas of TCTP are agriculture, health, vocational training and environmental sector (SAKAGUCHI, 2012). Initially, the focus of the program had been Latin America but it was expanded to African Portuguese speaking countries (PALOP in Portuguese)¹¹ and East Timor¹² (JICA, 2010). In 2001 was launched the Joint Training Program, that was integrated to TCTP in 2009, allowing a joint formulation and sharing of costs (JICA, 2010).

Until 2009 TCTP had been trained around 2300 people, more than 500 from Africa (JICA, 2010) and until 2012, 51 projects had been carried out (SAKAGUCHI, 2012). The TCTP Japan-Brazil is considered by JICA (2010) the biggest of this kind around the world, in projects scale and diversity of themes.

In 1992 an integrated research group of economic cooperation and political consultation sent to Brazil put TrC as one of Japan’s technical cooperation priorities (IFIC, 2002). Since then, TrC always appears as priority in Brazil-Japan cooperation. In 2000, how was already mentioned, Japan and Brazil signed the JBPP, “enabling large scale joint projects” (SAKAGUCHI, 2012:227). Its main objective is the development of joint projects to contribute for the world development, with belief in the synergy created by triangular partnership. JBPP includes joint projects, seminars and training courses. In this partnership, there is a planning committee, including JICA and ABC, that define priorities, strategies and areas should be covered by the program (JICA, 2010).

Under this framework, from October 2007 to November 2012 were held thirteen joint projects, fourteen seminars and seventeen new trainings. It is important to highlight that this framework is not exclusive from Japanese-Brazilian

¹⁰ Celso Amorim was the Brazilian Minister of foreign affairs and Sadako Ogata was the Director of JICA. This meeting aimed at elaboration of projects for JBPP framework. It is interesting to observe that this meeting was not realized between people on the same hierarchy in their countries, considering JICA is below Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in hierarchy.

¹¹ First TrC project of Brazil and Japan towards Africa was in 1989, with a training on fighting fire (CAVALCANTE, 2015).

¹² Now has been expanded to Asian and African countries of French and English language (JICA, 2010).

relations and make part of Japanese efforts to promote its TrC around the world. Documents establishing the same kind of framework had signed, until 2013, with eleven countries besides Brazil. Japan has been a strong proponent of south-south cooperation and TrC since 1970s (SAKAGUCHI, 2012; NOMURA RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 2013).

The first initiative under JBPP happened in 2001. It was a mission to Angola and Mozambique to formulate projects to be applied in the future, considering the priorities of the program: PALOP, in agriculture and health. For the authors, the priority given to PALOP recognizes the resources of Portuguese language as a characteristic of the Brazil-Japan trilateral cooperation (IFIC, 2002).

In 2007, Celso Amorim, Sadako Ogata and JICA president met and agree on a series of projects to be held in Latin America and Africa, including the first one: a training at Hospital Josina Machel, in Angola. This project planted the seeds of ProFORÇA, a project aimed at the strengthening of health system in Angola. In the same year there were just two projects realized in JBPP, in 2008 were four and in 2009 already were nine, showing the growing projection of the partnership. (SAKAGUCHI, 2012).

Last phase of cooperation Brazil-Japan was inaugurated by the launching of a new concept under JBPP, in 2010, the “Japan-Brazil Global partnership for solution of global issues” (SAKAGUCHI, 2012). Reinforcing the salience of TrC, this concept seems to highlight also the global role of Brazilian and Japanese insertion in international scenario, targeting a major role in Security Council of United Nations as permanent members, as well as other motivations.

For Kota Sakaguchi (2012), initially JBPP was a mean Japan used to support capacity development for Brazil to become a donator, now it became a real partnership. After Japan, “(...) more and more actors are coming to team up with Brazil as strategic partner in triangular cooperation”, because of its accumulated knowledge, mainly related to tropical areas, and its potential as partner in international scenario (SAKAGUCHI, 2012:230). This phenomenon can be confirmed by the ABC chart showing triangular projects held by Brazil with partner countries, like United States, Germany and Spain, among others. From 2000 to 2015, Japan and Brazil promoted together 74 triangular initiatives. In this regard, Mozambique was the receptor of thirteen projects/programs with both

Brazil and Japan and of 34 projects/programs developed by Brazil in partnership with all countries. According to this data, Japan is by far the main Brazilian partner in TrC¹³.

This phenomenon can be consequence of the Japan's pioneering in TrC among traditional donors. The beginning of its Training program in third countries dates back to 1974 (in the period of its ODA consolidation) and Japan have contributed to United Nations Development Program (UNDP) support of SSC (PINO, 2013; MOCHIZUKI, 2009). Triangular cooperation relevance in Japanese Foreign policy is present even in the most important document of Japanese ODA, the ODA charter (revised in 2003), that says Japan: "will actively promote South-South cooperation in partnership with more advanced developing countries in Asia and other regions" (JAPAN, 2003).

According to Uehara (2008:10): "the objective of this policy is to attribute more efficiency and less costs to assistance offered for Japan for poorest developing nations", because of the benefits brought by cultural similarities¹⁴. TrC also can be viewed like a manner to strengthen relations with emerging countries and of the international insertion of Japan ("to disseminate policies and approaches"), part of the efforts to consolidate a proper ODA model. (CAVALCANTE, 2015:77). In this sense, MOFA clearly expressed TrC is important for Japan to strengthen the relationship with Brazil, complement other resources of ODA and support the capacity building in Brazil (MOFA, 2010). For Nomura Research Institute Ltd. (2013:10), this kind of cooperation "is an important measure for maintaining Japan's presence in the international community".

For Brazil, some of the reasons are the interest in scale the projects (with more funds and technology) as well as, the impact of them; learning methods and managing, and strengthening of bilateral relations (SAKAGUCHI, 2012; ABREU, 2013). In recent years, Brazilian TrC have been surpassed bilateral cooperation budget. In 2013, the TrC budget was of US\$54 million and 37 projects was been executed (ABREU, 2013). Thinking about the Brazilian interest in participate the

¹³ ABC. "Cooperação Trilateral com Países". Available at: <http://www.abc.gov.br/Gestao/TrilateralPaíses> (access on July 01, 2016).

¹⁴ Free translation of: "o objetivo dessa política é atribuir maior eficiência e menor custo à assistência oferecida pelo Japão às nações em desenvolvimento mais pobres" (UEHARA, 2008:10).

building of international rules and institutions, one of the reasons for Brazil to focus on TrC is trying to influence the aid architecture.

4. Relationship between Brazil and Japan in ProSAVANA

The Triangular Cooperation Program for the Agricultural Development of Mozambican Tropical Savannah (ProSAVANA) is a program has been developed by Brazil, Japan and Mozambique, that have emerged from the long relationship between Brazil and Japan. The program was conceived in the context of JBPP and the first step to this happened in April of 2009, when Kenzo Oshima (then JICA vice-president) was visiting Brazil and signed with Marco Farani (then ABC director) a minute of meeting compromising themselves with the joint development of a program in African Tropical Savannah. In this occasion, JICA presented to Brazil the first proposal of the program, already establishing the Japanese preference for the execution of their plans in Mozambique (JICA; ABC; MRE, 2009; JICA, 2010).

Just a month later, a Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG) mission came to Brazil in order to know the Cerrado agricultural development, an achievement of the Nipo-Brazilian Cooperation Program for the Cerrado Development (PRODECER), a joint project financed by Japan that started in the 1970s. During the MINAG mission, the first proposal for what later became ProSAVANA was presented to Mozambique. Although, it was just in July of 2009, after the proposal had already been made to Mozambique, Brazil and Japan officially signed a purpose of an agricultural program in African Savannah (still without mentioning Mozambique). The signature happened during the meeting of G8+5, in L'Aquila G8 Conference, the called Heiligendamm Process, of what African countries do not participate. After that, in September of the same year, Brazil and Japan organized a joint mission to Mozambique, when was signed the Triparty Memorandum of ProSAVANA (FINGERMANN, 2014; TOLEDO, 2015).

Beyond its negotiations, the context of the program is the adoption of an agribusiness model by African countries. This objective became a priority in national politics of those countries, counting on the local elite support (TOLEDO, 2015). After the food, energetic and financial crisis of 2000s the pressure for a “green revolution” became bigger in those countries, because of the scarcity of

food and energy in many African countries. Mozambique is one of those countries, where the necessity of food created a fertile land for agricultural programs (SHANKLAND; GONÇALVES, 2016).

Mozambique also adopted agribusiness model and public-private partnerships for agriculture development. The mark of this adoption was the Strategic Plan for the Agrarian Sector Development (Plano Estratégico para o Desenvolvimento do Sector Agrário - PEDSA 2011-2020) (TOLEDO, 2015; GOVERNO DE MOÇAMBIQUE, 2011) launching. The PEDSA is aligned with the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Program (CAADP), in the context of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (GOVERNO DE MOÇAMBIQUE, 2011) and with the guidelines of the Plan for Absolute Poverty Reduction (Plano para Redução da Pobreza Absoluta - PARPA II 2006-2009) (GOVERNO DE MOÇAMBIQUE, 2006; FINGERMANN, 2014). Therefore, ProSAVANA was idealized by Japan but does not appear like an imposed model, because that kind of agrarian development had already been tried in that country. Nevertheless, it is not possible to be sure how these ideas penetrated Mozambican frontiers, since PEDSA was launched in 2011, at the same time of ProSAVANA launching, what can indicate a correlation between them.

In ProSAVANA, as well as in PRODECER, Brazil and Japan have adopted a holistic approach, looking for the integral development of the agrarian sector, not only narrow projects. The main objective is the development of the crops entire productive chain, in order to change the production in a competitive and sustainable one. According to JICA (2010), ProSAVANA aiming at guaranteeing food nutrition and development of an agricultural productive system toward exportation. The knowledge and expertise have been used in the program are that developed in PRODECER, considered a successful example of cooperation between Brazil and Japan. Despite of it, ProSAVANA is not a replica of PRODECER (EKMAN AND MACAMO, 2014; IFIC, 2002).

The program has been put into practice in Nampula, Niassa and Zambezia provinces, reaching 19 districts in the Northern Mozambique, in Nacala Corridor region (EKMAN and MACAMO, 2014). It is composed by two major phases: identification of strategies and projects, and mobilization of public and private capital (SAKAGUCHI, 2012). The main components of the first phase are: improvement of physical and institutional capacities in research and diffusion of

knowledge; insertion and improvement of new crops, and development of a Master Plan, to guide the program (JICA, 2010).

ProSAVANA is managed by a Joint Committee of Coordination, a Joint Technical Committee and a Regional Coordination and the estimative of total budget is U\$36,2 million (FINGERMANN, 2014). The components of the program have been developed by different think tanks, agriculture advising companies, federal ministries and other public and private organizations

The program has been very criticized because of the co-relations with PRODECER. This have happened because of the choice was made, for the agribusiness model, pointed by social movements and researchers as dangerous for the environment and causing social problems, like replacements and exploration of small farmers (NOGUEIRA and OLLINAHO, 2013; SCHLESINGER, 2013). Other criticism has been done is the lack of transparency and participation of small farmers. In this regard, Mozambican social movements and agricultural associations created a campaign against ProSAVANA. Movements and other organizations around the world, mainly of Brazil and Japan, have been supported this campaign (SHANKLAND AND GONÇALVES, 2016).

Aligned with the lack of civil society participation, there is a supposed lack of Mozambican ownership at the governmental level. One fact can be observed in this sense is the analysis made by a Japanese NGO showing the contracts about civilian consultation were made by JICA, not by the Mozambican government, that would improve the country's ownership (NO! to land grab et al, 2016). Another related controversy is the fact ProSAVANA is an initiative of Japan, firstly presented to Brazil. In this sense, Toledo (2015) states that Mozambique neither participated in the formulation of the program. This lack of Mozambican participation in the formulation of the program can be considerate controversial because of the lack of information available.

Even with the critics, ProSAVANA have been presented as an example and symbol of a new phase in the Brazil-Japan partnership (JICA, 2010). Although this does not mean it was idealized by Mozambican people. The information is that it is a high diplomacy initiative and emerged from the Japanese-Brazilian alliance (CESARINO, 2015). For Ferrando (2015), the program has been characterized by the struggle between governments and business representatives and civil society and communities (FERRANDO, 2015).

Coming back to the context of ProSAVANA it is important to highlight that Mozambique have been an important partner of both Brazil and Japan in the last years. They established their relations with Mozambique in 1975 (Brazil) and 1977 (Japan) and, since then, have maintained a good relationship with this country. Also, it is possible to observe they both have shown changeful strength of these relations (CHICHAVA and DURÁN, 2016). In recent years, for example, we can perceive a rapprochement between Brazil and Mozambique and between Japan and Mozambique (CAVALCANTE, 2015). Two of the common reasons for both are the low cost of land and geographical proximity with Asian markets (SAKAGUCHI, 2012). Besides ProSAVANA, until 2015, Japan and Brazil had agreed on other 73 trilateral projects/activities. Together with Mozambique, both Brazil and Japan developed 13 activities, from 2000 to June of 2016.

In Japanese case, the Shinzo Abe visit to Mozambique in January 2014 marked a new period of closer relationships. The country is important to Japan because of the reserves of gas and coal, besides the geographic localization, not so far from Asia, like Europe or America. Agriculture and infrastructure are the priority areas of cooperation between them. In 2012, one of the relevant points for this article was the establishment of a partnership with the office of ZEE of Nacala, resulting in the launching of the Strategy for Development in Nacala Corridor. ProSAVANA is also part of this strategy (IKEGAMI, 2015; JICA, 2016).

In Brazilian case, the strengthening of relations in the start of 21th century was part of a major context of rapprochement of Brazil with all African countries, mainly speak Portuguese countries. In this period, the trade, visits and cooperation between Brazil and those countries grew up. Two of the marks of this strengthening were the launching of an antiretroviral medicine factory in Mozambique, sponsored by the Brazilian laboratory FIOCRUZ, and the exploration concession of Moatize, a big coal reserve in the country, to a Brazilian company, Vale (SOUZA, 2015; SARAIVA, 2012).

It is interesting to note that the committee that formulated the recommendations to Japan ODA towards Brazil in 2002, recommended the focus in agriculture, global issues and promotion of economic relations between Brazil and Japan (IFIC, 2002), areas that seems coincide with the objectives of ProSAVANA. Food security and PALOP also appears as priorities in JBPP (SCHLESSINGER, 2013).

How already previously showed, Brazil and Japan have also strengthened their relations in the 2000s. Considering these rapprochements and priority Japan has given in its foreign policy for agriculture and food security, as well as for global issues, we can see enough reasons to start a program like ProSAVANA. In this sense, the program could be useful for both, Japan and Brazil to getting closer of Mozambique and as a mean of investors entrance and guaranteeing market and products access in Africa.

Mozambican savannah occupied an area of approximately 55 million hectares, corresponding to an area fifteen times bigger than cultivable area on Japan, because of this, could constitutes an import source of food for Japan. Beyond it, there are evidences that “Brazilian and Japanese capital are ready to profit” with ProSAVANA and that governments are supporting them. In the same sense, not only Brazilian and Japanese investors are ready to profit but also the Mozambican elite that has a deep connection with foreign donors, due to the importance development cooperation has for the country (SAKAGUCHI, 2012; FERRANDO, 2015:354; FINGERMANN, 2014).

In TrC Brazil occupies a position as pivotal country, building a bridge between the developed partner and the other developing partner. For Japan it is easier to has Brazil as partner instead of cooperate alone in countries like Mozambique, because of the language¹⁵ and the Brazilian positive image around the world. It happens because of its successful Brazilian experiences in areas like hunger and HIV public treatment. For Ferrando (2015:355), the hegemony Brazil exercises at ProSAVANA is linked “at a surface level” to its superiority in tropical agricultural technology and geographical similarities.

Despite of its good image, Brazil has shown many problems in development cooperation implementation. Some of them can be applied specially to ProSAVANA while others can be seen in the general Brazilian development cooperation. Two of those characteristics that can be also problems are flexibility and pragmatism in the application of principles. The reasons for that could be the lack of legal framework and the lack of a policy for international development

¹⁵ Both Brazil and Mozambique are Portuguese speaking countries. Despite of that, for Cesarino (2015), comparing ProSAVANA and Cotton-4, both projects in Africa, ProSAVANA complexity looks counterweight the advantages of the language. According to Fingermann (2014) cultural ties have proved positively, but there is not a lot of knowledge about the other country among them.

cooperation in the country, constraints to its effective deployment (CHICHAVA and DURÁN, 2016; CESARINO, 2015).

The lack of legal framework makes Brazilian development cooperation less stable and subject to changes in the government and economy, more than it would be with otherwise. In the last few years, for example, political and economic changes in Brazil have caused a decrease in the ABC's budget, diminution of development cooperation rhetoric and, at the same time, announcement of big enterprises, like ProSAVANA (CHICHAVA and DURÁN, 2016). According to Fingermann (2014), the ABC's budget specifically to Africa alone, was reduced in 74% between 2010 and 2013 (from US\$20,2 millions to US\$5,3millions). This budget cut has started to affect ProSAVANA already during Dilma government. Besides, the lack of legal framework also caused some Brazilian delays in ProSAVANA.

Some capacity and system problems of come together and are reinforced by the lack of legal framework. That results in heterogeneity and instability of Brazilian development cooperation strategies, discourses and practices. Some of those problems are:

- Lack of specialized offices abroad;
- Decision-making located almost exclusively in Brazil;
- Accounting and procurement systems used are from UNDP;
- Underdevelopment of methods to formulate, monitorate and evaluate the initiatives;
- Executors' institutions diversity (SAKAGUCHI, 2012; FINGERMAN, 2014; CESARINO, 2015).

In her conclusions Fingermann (2014) states that cooperation "success" is related to at least three aspects: establishment of persuasive visions/interpretations, maintenance of this visions, and network of supporters. For her, this is not possible in the case of ProSAVANA because of the lack of coordination among the partners and low institutionalization of ABC. The program was launched in 2011 and it was just in 2012 ABC representative was assigned to Mozambique (CHICHAVA and DURÁN, 2016).

In the phase of implementation, one fact draws attention: the separated management of two different laboratories, in Lichinga and Nampua, respectively by ABC and JICA. This kind of management generates a conflictual space

between two different approaches (FINGERMANN, 2014). According to Fingermann (2014), Ikegami (2015) and Toledo (2015), there are the Japanese ProSAVANA and the Brazilian ProSAVANA. Some examples of this are: a delay of EMBRAPA that resulted in a Japanese declaration that it would start the first phase of the program without Brazil and there are different payments in both different laboratories (of Japan and Brazil) (FINGERMANN, 2014).

Wherefore, the labor division and lack of integration between Brazil and Japan have locked the improvement of their partnership (CAVALCANTE, 2015). In this sense, one of the points for further promotion featured for Sakaguchi (2012) towards TrC coincide with problems have been seen in ProSAVANA implementation. For him, it is necessary develop practical implementation structure, in terms of communication. It would improve ProSAVANA implementation considering that even the discourses of both Brazil and Japan have changed and are different, mainly when the subject is related to the critics towards the ProSAVANA agribusiness model (IKEGAMI, 2015; FUNADA-CLASSEN, 2013).

For while, there are few studies about specific triangular initiatives and even less include field research but it is possible to state that this kind of cooperation include complex relations and it is difficult to find patterns when there are more partners, including three governments, state agencies and ministries, NGO's, private companies, etc.. In ProSAVANA's case, specifically, the magnitude of the program also makes more complex the task of study it.

There is a gap between discourse and practice in TrC, considering the discourse of equal partnership have developed and the debate NSC *versus* SSC, that should (in theory) serve to improvement in the ineffective points of both (FINGERMANN, 2014). Corroborating to this gap, it is possible to observe, for example, the temptation of co-optation of new donors and the prominence of the northern (traditional donors) ideas, without a rupture in the standard of cooperation. According to André Toledo (2015), this kind of framework guarantee another interests that are "incompatible with horizontality" ("incompatíveis com a horizontalidade") and with demand-driven principle, presumably present mainly in SSC.

However, the debate Traditional *versus* New donors do not covers the entire complexity of TrC (MCEWAN AND MAWDSLEY, 2012). In this sense, it is

possible to find different ideas about the relationship is building in TrC initiatives, among all partners or just among States. In ProSAVANA, the lack of information has resulted in a big variety of different perspectives, above all, about the roles Brazil, Japan, Mozambique and the private sector have been occupying in the program.

One of the reasons to go beyond the North-South relationship analysis is that elites, investors and capital are not national, and these actors have played an important role in ProSAVANA. It can be observed a strong relationship with agricultural investors and agribusiness in general in ProSAVANA. They look for power and profit, no matter where they go. Various partnerships or actions taken by governments have been classified as “non-sense” are actually result of this. One of the examples is exposed by Toledo (2015), with the Brazilian defense of national agricultural investors creating a domestic law making more difficult the foreign acquisition of land in Brazil while trying to open the land market in Mozambique, an apparently contradiction.

About Brazilian role in ProSAVANA, one of the possibilities is Brazil been a “proxy” of Japanese interests. This would transform Brazil in an important tool in Asian power balance, because of Japanese interests tied to its rivalry with China and United States. Besides, Japan necessity of diversify soybeans production could transform Brazil in a “Trojan horse” helping China to enter in Mozambique, that at the end maintains its unequal relations with Japan, just as Mozambique (TOLEDO, 2015)

In my view, it is not possible to state that every TrC represents a co-optation process by the northern powers in relation to southern ones, due to the existence of new donors’ interests and the elite’s interests in these countries. It is interesting to observe that one of the critics have been done to SSC is the lack of horizontality, sometimes reproducing north-south relations in development cooperation. In this sense, it is difficult to see a process of co-optation with the argument that TrC have been re-inscribing the hierarchy of north-south relationships. Because if both, NSC and SSC, seems to be vertical. So, new donors seems not being co-optated but just adopting a pattern in which the more powerful country choose the directions of the initiative, independently if it is a traditional or new donor.

In spite of that, it is possible to think on a trying, for the part of traditional donors, in inserting the emerging donors in DAC system (with their norms, rules, methodologies, etc.), even if Japan has been presented since the 1960s a different behavior when compared to another DAC countries. Wherefore, observing the Japanese behavior out of the DAC pattern, it is possible to think also in a hypothesis with Japan trying to legitimate their own model, out of DAC system, including the TrC in itself.

Still in the relationship between traditional and new donors, for Tortora (2011), NSC and SSC are complementary and, inside the common ground between them, they should find a manner to cooperate, translating it in a “new architecture” for IDC. For him, this common ground is composed by principles like: ownership, broad participation (of parliamentarians, civil society, scholars and private sector), demand-driven capacity development, mutual accountability and development beyond aid. Although, to acquire that “new architecture”, with all donors creating a common framework seems to be necessary a long time from now, considering the controversies of TrC and the different discourses both (new and traditional donors) have adopted.

However, in this game, there are still a lot of things we do not know about the real interests and negotiation process between the partners. We used to put in the same group very different countries. In this sense, there are many possibilities of interests being served and patterns being developed, because, in the “South” and among the “emerging donors” there are countries with varied capacities and interests, as well as in the “North” and among “traditional donors”.

Final considerations

Both Brazil and Japan went from receptors to donators in the development cooperation history, and have kept a good relationship, despite of the instability caused by periods of great enthusiasm and others of low dynamism in their relations. Also for both, cooperation has played an important role as foreign policy instrument, considering that they are not military powers, and the triangular cooperation has occupied a growing role inside their development cooperation.

As well as the cooperation, the relationship with Mozambique has been presenting growing relevance for Brazil and Japan foreign affairs. This

phenomenon coincide with a period of strengthening in the Brazil-Japan relationship, putting the triangular cooperation as a priority with the JBPP, whose priorities are African Portuguese speakers and Latin American countries. Still in this scenario, both countries in their relationship have adopted an approach towards global issues, as the fight against food scarcity and hunger. Wherefore, it can be said ProSAVANA is part of the priorities of both countries, since it has an integral approach, aim at a global issue like hunger, in an African speaker country and as a triangular cooperation program. Besides, Mozambique has opened the eyes of many countries because of its inexpensive land, fast growing and the strong relationship it has with development cooperation, being extremely dependent of this source of income.

ProSAVANA also fits well in some characteristics pointed in the analysis of TrC in general and of the changing paradigms of development cooperation. One characteristic that is also a problem is the poor coordination among partners. This aspect has given serious consequences for the program's development. Another one, related to the changing paradigm is the growing number of partners, a trend of development cooperation after the 1990s. In ProSAVANA, just one of the components has been developed by public agencies (ProSAVANA-PI), the other components have been executed by private companies and investors. The lack of horizontality and the big transaction costs are other problems that are part of development cooperation even in bilateral initiatives.

In this sense, ProSAVANA has contributed for the observation of the coordination and communication challenges in TrC and how these problems can affect the effectivity and the image of a program/initiative. These seems the main problems of the program until now, together with the decrease in the Brazilian budget for development cooperation and the lack of legal framework to support it. The economic and political problems Brazil has passed by, shows us the relevance of the context and legal framework for this kind of initiative. Despite of the most part of problems seems to be of the Brazilian part, we have to be attentive for the fact that even most developed countries with a lot of experience in development cooperation also have difficulties in building their own cooperation framework and principles, as showed by the analysis of Lancaster (2009).

An important issue for TrC is the relation between traditional and new donors, an apparent contradiction, considering that SSC adopt a discourse of differentiation with NSC. At the discourse level, SSC reinforce principles like the horizontality and demand-driven, that do not seem present in ProSAVANA, for example. One of the hypothesis is that traditional donors can use TrC to co-opt the new ones.

In the case of ProSAVANA, talking about co-optation seems difficult because Japan traditionally has supported SSC and has differentiated itself from traditional donors, despite of the pressure for homogenization. It is possible even that Japan would be trying to legitimize its own model, instead of trying to co-opt Brazil to adopt DAC/OECD patterns.

Despite of the trial of homogenize and find patterns in TrC, this kind of cooperation is a very complex one, with different actors involved and the discourse is far from the reality. In this regard, we could highlight the role assigned to agribusiness and investors in ProSAVANA. The discourse about the fight against hunger has its legitimacy, but we can ask ourselves if the program would put in practice if there were no interests from the investors. This is another face of the ProSAVANA debate, goes beyond the North-South debate. In this sense, we can observe the contradictions present in TrC and in the development issues in general, once TrC does not break the patterns of unequal relations neither the western development models.

About the changing landscape of development cooperation, we can hypothesize that Brazil and Japan in ProSAVANA have contributed to this changes, working together and with many other partners. On the other side, they helped to show a continuity in the classical division between North and South, according as the coordination and communication have not worked well and the initial idea was from Japan, breaking the SSC principle of demand-driven. There is still a big gap between those countries, not just culturally but in terms of experience in development cooperation, including legal and institutional frameworks.

The lack of information about the program and the differences in information and discourses were challenges for the present research. Therefore, it is still necessary to go beyond and study other initiatives. This research

constitutes just a preliminary study that will continue to be developed, looking to explore more about ProSAVANA and its impact in the development cooperation.

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