Paper short abstract:

This paper addresses the rent distributive effect of Iranian electoral rules which brings petro populism as a structural characteristic of political economy.

Paper long abstract:

Petro populism has been widely debated in the political economy literature by scholars such as Parenti (2005), Looney (2007), Foroohar (2009), Matsen, Norvic and Torvik (2016). Most of the studies analyzed this phenomenon as a political agenda in rentier states. This paper argues that Petro populism is not only an agenda on the part of some political leaders in Iran as a state-led developing country but also a more structural characteristic of the political economy. According to the constitution of Islamic republic of Iran, only individual candidates -even with factional tendencies- can take part in competitions. Although establishing parties is not prohibited but they don't have specific position in electoral rules. so electoral rules have established the direct accountability of representatives toward voters; hence, even a candidate who only cares about his/her seat will promise voters public, and even, private goods and services, because it increases his chance of being (re)elected. While this incentive satisfies voters, it has the adverse effect of massive increases in government expenditures and hurting the economic interests of the country. The most significant effect of this system is that even non-populist politicians should enter, to some extent, this destructive competition for rent-distribution. I have used content analysis on parliamentary debates transcripts in 1989-2004, which is known as a more pragmatic era in the history of the Islamic Republic to show what type of governmental policies had been considered by the parliament's members.