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Accepted Paper:
Mercenaries, missionaries and misfits: competition in the aid marketplace in Afghanistan
Matthew Willner-Reid (University of Oxford)
Paper short abstract:
The prioritization of humanitarian need has important implications for resource allocation but as it is always presented externally as a technocratic process conducted by disinterested and altruistic actors the power dynamics involved are obscured and have thus largely avoided academic scrutiny.
Paper long abstract:
This paper explores, from an inter-disciplinary perspective, the dynamics of competition that are inherent to the 'aid marketplace' in Afghanistan. It argues that actors within the marketplace are neither solely self-interested power maximisers, nor wholly altruistic actors, but rather seek to balance both rational agendas (maximizing financial and social capital) and normative agendas (aid goals specific to their organization or sector). They do this within an incentive structure that encourages a focus on narrowly defined, or process-related, objectives, which in turn leads to fragmentation and undermines collective action goals.
Further, the paper argues that while the marketplace is generally perceived of as hierarchical, with power concentrated at the top, the ability to exert influence is in fact more diffuse than imagined. This is particularly the case in regards to 'first tier' partners in the aid chain (Afghan government and UN). Multiple dynamics (such as co-dependence to achieve objectives, sensitivity to lobby pressure, bureaucratic inertia, and lack of coordination) weaken donor control over the marketplace, but information asymmetries play a particularly crucial role.
Due to imperfect information at the donor level, certain actors (e.g. UN agencies) or processes (e.g. the cluster system) are delegated authority to define and prioritise humanitarian need in particular sectors. This is done in a way that is presented externally as technocratic and disinterested but which conceals inevitable competition between different interests (both rational and normative) that seek to influence the resulting discourse. This paper seeks to shed a light on these dynamics.
Power, politics and development in Afghanistan
Session 1