Paper short abstract:

. The paper systematically examines different explanations for why states decide to establish ACAs, providing evidence for the international and domestic drivers of institutional diffusion.

Paper long abstract:

Between 1994 and 2014, the number of anti-corruption commissions has dramatically increased. This raises three important questions: first, why do states adopt a seemingly ineffective institution? Second, why do they make this specific institutional choice? Third, given that corruption is seen as culturally specific, what might explain the uniformity in the adoption of this institution?

The literature has so far provided little evidence for the dynamics driving the diffusion of anti-corruption agencies. This paper fills this gap. It builds on existing explanations for policy diffusion and combines these will a novel and global dataset of anti-corruption agencies. We integrate the domestic, regional and international level in our framework to assess the impact domestic variables or external factors may have. Specifically, we theorise that the diffusion of anti-corruption agencies may be directly driven by donor coercion and norm entrepreneurs or indirectly through neighbourhood competition and norm emulation. We also ask whether a strong civil society demanding the need for an ACA effects the establishment of an institution, as well as a change in political leadership.