Paper short abstract:

This paper examines how elite heterogeneity and the development-orientation of elites, considered as salient features of political settlements in fragile societies, influence the organization and delivery of security by state security organizations.

Paper long abstract:

Since 2014, Clingendael's Conflict Research Unit (CRU) runs a research project that examines, through comparative case study work, two exploratory hypotheses on how particular characteristics of the political settlement in fragile societies influence the organization and delivery of security by state security institutions:

• Conflict prone-societies with more heterogeneous elites will tend to, formally or informally, organize state security institutions along more factional lines than societies with more homogeneous elites. This perpetuates elite fragmentation, aggravates inter-elite competition in times of crisis and reduces the prospects for more citizen-oriented security provision despite the positive incentive of inter-elite competition;

• Elites that are developmentally-oriented in how they use state power logically pay more attention to providing security to their citizens but will still use state security organizations to maintain the political status quo, associated political power and their own interests. A consequence is that political stasis is likely to limit development potential unless elite/leadership succession crisis can be handled peacefully.

The project has so far conducted two case studies (Lebanon and Ethiopia). This paper intends to synthesize their findings and enrich them with theoretical concepts as well as evidence from the wider conflict and development literature to develop an initial evidence base and a more detailed research agenda.

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