Paper short abstract:

This paper analyses the 'political settlement' underpinning a levy collected from Philippine coconut producers. It shows how the approach can be used to assess the developmental potential of specific market-attenuating state interventions ostensibly designed to foster productive expansion.

Paper long abstract:

This paper examines through the lens of 'political settlements' one of the most iconic cases of corruption allegedly perpetuated in the Philippines under President Ferdinand Marcos: the collection of levies from coconut producers and the subversion of their uses to purportedly benefit presidential cronies. These levies were collected from among the poorest producers but most important agro-export sectors in the Philippines. They were collected not only to ostensibly enhance the sector's productive capacity, but also in such a way that included the voice of the leading sectoral organisation in the mobilisation of the levies. By deploying the lens of 'political settlements', it examines the extent to which inclusion of coconut producers' voice shaped the distribution of benefits associated with levies. Since levies were mobilised for use in investments with continuing value, processes of bargaining for a right to these benefits continued long after Marcos had been deposed from power in 1986. It examines the evolution of the associated political settlement during and after the Marcos period: how it was regulated, who benefited and how. This paper will show that the deployment of a sectoral approach in the exploration of 'political settlements' enables the analysis of coconut levies beyond the story of Marcosian plunder, which dominates analysis of these levies. The application of this lens reveals a view of the conditions in political economy that circumscribe the possibilities for economic development, and from which inferences can be drawn about the political challenges of long-run economic transformation in the Philippines.