

The influence of providers of South-South cooperation on traditional Northern donors

The reactions within the United States and the United Kingdom

By Milena S. Elsinger*

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* Research Associate, Institute of Political Science, University of Marburg. Contact: milena.elsinger@gmail.com

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Abstract

Most existing research on the topics of South-South Cooperation has focused on the individual donor policies of Southern providers, often in comparison with the model of traditional donors. However, the consequences that traditional donors draw from this increased South-South cooperation remain an understudied field of research.

This paper is a valuable addition to the discussion and investigates the consequences that two traditional donors draw from the activities of Southern providers, namely the United Kingdom and the United States. I use a qualitative approach to analyse government documents and expert interviews over a ten-year period, which allows me to look at three levels within the reaction of the traditional providers: first, their perception of Southern providers. Are Southern providers perceived as a threat? Are they taken as a model for cooperation? Second, the level of the narrative: what does the Northern provider claim to do in response to Southern providers? And lastly, the level of practice: how much of the narrative's claims are actually put into practice?

The paper argues that the initial responses of both donors are comparable: in both states, Southern providers are perceived to be a challenge to the current development system. Both pledge in their official narratives to increase support for activities related to good governance and human rights and both fail to deliver on the translation of these narratives into practice. The paper investigates the motives behind this apparent contradiction and thereby contributes to the discussion about the future of relationships between the two groups.

1 Introduction

The activities of so-called emerging donors in Africa attract the attention of many researchers. Most publications focus on the ambiguous and influential relationship between China and Africa. However, the interesting question of the influence of emerging donors on traditional North-South relationships remains understudied. The emergence of new donors could lead to a loss of influence of the North and is therefore likely to influence traditional donor policies. The United States and the United Kingdom are both key actors in development aid and are two of the affected players.

This paper asks the question if and how emerging donors challenge the aid policies of the United Kingdom and the United States in the field of conditionality. Literature has shown that this is the most prominent difference between emerging and traditional donors: While traditional donors emphasise the promotion of democratic values and the respect of human rights, emerging donors refrain from imposing conditions on recipients (Hackenesch 2009). Hence, a change of that policy is likely. This paper looks at the conditional approach regarding human rights and finds that the increase in activities of emerging donors leads to a change in the narratives on aid conditionality, but fails to trigger a change in the practices of aid.

The paper is structured as follows: A short literature review first introduces the research gap that this paper wants to address. Section 3 briefly introduces the theoretical and methodological framework of the paper. I use a theoretical framework focussing on the institutional changes that are taking place in the rules, narratives and practices of the United Kingdom and the United States development policies. Methodologically, I combine quantitative with qualitative data. Section 4 analyses these policy implications for the United Kingdom's and the United States policies towards the conditionality in human rights policies. Section 5 concludes.

2 Literature review

The concept of development cooperation is said to reflect many realities in the relationships between different world powers and between different levels of income across the world (Eckert 2015; Klingebiel 2014). In the last decade, two major themes have dominated the research within the field of development aid: the first concentrates on the usefulness of aid for triggering development in recipient countries under the umbrella of the discussions surrounding aid effectiveness (Easterly 2008; Wright and Winters 2010).

The second important field of investigation is the one that is studied here: the debate between academics and political experts about the emergence of new aid-giving parties. While some textbooks from the mid-2000s still completely neglect the importance of South-South cooperation (Nuscheler 2005, 482–85), many recent studies acknowledge the importance of new donors (while often stressing that the phenomenon itself is not new, but the scale on which it occurs is, see Dreher, Fuchs, and Nunnenkamp 2013; Engel 2012). For instance, Abdenur and Da Fonseca, João Moura Estevão Marques (2013, 1476–77) argue that one of the major changes in development cooperation in the last ten years is the appearance of new stakeholders in South-South cooperation. Similarly, Gilles Carbonnier and Andy Sumner (2012, 4) state that emerging donors “erode the de facto oligopoly” of traditional donors.

This study is interested mainly in the consequences that traditional donors derive from the emergence of “new” players. What has been said, albeit cautiously, about the implications of emerging donors for traditional donors can be divided into four types of arguments;

First, some studies argue that the result of the arrival of new donors within the international aid game will lead to an increased competition for resources (Gu, Humphrey, and Messner 2008; Hackenesch and Ling, June 01, 2009). This could extend to a competition over the work force in recipient countries, or over access to valued natural resources, for instance in African countries (Alden and Alves 2009; Bracho 2015, 27–29; Kappel 2014; Homi J. Kharas and Rogerson 2012; Wu 2012). Hartmut Sangmeister and Alexa Schönstedt (2010) argue that this could even lead to an excess of aid in highly desirable recipient countries. The scenario of increased competitiveness is often linked to studies focussing on China’s policies in Africa. As such, Christine Hackenesch (2013, 30) concludes in a study on the relationship between the European Union and China in Africa that “China constitutes a considerable competitive pressure on the European aid regime”. Similarly, Sanjukta Bhattacharya (2010) argues that the situation will lead to an increased competition between China and the United States over African oil, a phenomenon that as Christina Stolte and Dana La Fontaine (2012) argue could also apply to other emerging donors and other traditional forces.

Altogether more positively, some studies state that emerging donors are largely “complementary” to Western aid efforts (Klingebiel 2014, 18) and that the existing modalities of aid can persist and will not be challenged by emerging donors (Thede 2013; for a study arguing that China will not challenge the EU's aid distribution, see X. Zhang 2011). For instance, Pedro Morazán et al. (2012, 37) argue that “emerging donors are not necessarily in competition with [...] the DAC’s aid model”. This element of mutual congruence is often pointed to by studies which argue that the differences in aid distribution (especially in sectoral preferences) could prove beneficial for recipients.

Next to the emphasis on the competitiveness (or, indeed, congruence) of emerging and traditional donors, other academics argue that there is indeed a need to integrate the former into existing international structures in order to avoid negative consequences, such as an increased competition over resources or the over-aiding of particular countries. Some studies indicate for instance that while a certain weariness exists on the part of Western government and especially from the United States, other traditional donors, such as the United Kingdom, work strongly for an integration of emerging donors into existing structures (Alden 2007, 107–8; Chaturvedi 2012). Nevertheless, many academics are sceptical about the likelihood of a successful integration into existing structures. Many argue that the international aid architecture – within the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, as well as the Development Assistance Committee from the OECD and the G20 – are all inadequately equipped to handle the integration of emerging donors even though integration is highly desirable in order to guarantee positive side effects (Homi Kharas 2011; Walz and Ramachandran 2011, 22–23; Besharati 2013). It is feared that the aid of emerging donors – existing outside of the DAC structure – will undermine OECD standards (Stähle 2008; Klingebiel 2015). Some argue that the OECD could use two mechanisms at its disposal (peer review mechanisms and peer pressure) to include new Asian donors in its aid discussions (Paulo and Reisen 2009). This dialogue between the DAC and emerging donors is seen as even more important since the financial crisis further reduced the weight of traditional powers (Paulo and

Reisen 2010; for a similarly positive outlook on the future, see Zimmermann and Smith 2011; Hackenesch and H. Zhang 2013). The fact that South Korea (and to a certain extent Mexico, which obtained observer status) have already been successfully integrated into that structure is seen as a positive indicator for the projects' feasibility (Chun, Munyi, and H. Lee 2010). Nonetheless, in more recent years, many have pointed to the extreme selectiveness of DAC membership and argued that a wider international forum is needed to include emerging donors more directly into the debates without making them conform to restrictive DAC standards. The United Nations Development Cooperation Forum, inaugurated in 2005, is often seen as the most comprehensive option (Mahn and Weinlich 2012; Hammad and Morton July 2009). Since its creation in 2011, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation is also often referred to as being able to bridge the differences between the two donor groups (Klingebiel 2015). Higher integration is desired as increased fragmentation between the two groups could lead to increased competition and thereby undermine mutual understanding. Overall, this point of view argues that an increased coordination and cooperation could lead to the full benefit of all parties involved as the donor groups learn from each other (Berger and Grimm 2010; Manning 2006; Men and Barton 2011).

The majority of studies, however, agree that “[a] single paradigm for international cooperation is unlikely to emerge in the foreseeable future” (African Economic Outlook 2011, 113) and argue that the entry of emerging donors into the aid equation largely leads to a “paradigm shift” within the “dominant construction of foreign aid” diminishing the influence of traditional donors (Mawdsley, Savage, and Kim 2014, 27). Some argue modestly that while the overall amount of aid from emerging donors is not yet significant enough to “overshadow the dominance of traditional Western donors, [...] the impact of its aid is disproportionate to its size and is likely to grow” (Beaudet, Haslam, and Schafer 2012, 530). Others put it more bluntly and state, for instance, that China's involvement in Africa could be seen as “another indicator of the West's putative marginalization on the continent” (Alden, Large, and Soares de Oliveira 2008, 23) or argue that China is so present in many recent studies because it challenges the existing aid paradigm (Dent 2011). Similarly, many conclude that the United States is clearly challenged by the aid activities of its rival China, particularly in its backyard South America (Phillips 2010; Noesselt and Soliz Landivar 2013; Nolte 2013). Similarly, Stephan Klingebiel (2014, 73; Klingebiel 2013) argues that emerging donors “reduce the weight carried by the old OECD donor group appreciably” and others prophesy the “end of the DAC monopoly on aid” (Sangmeister and Schönstedt 2010, 151) or the reduction of traditional donors into “netogiated existence” (Chin and Quadir 2012, 501). The Economist writes that “in this world Europeans and Americans no longer dominate aid” and that the “rules of aid are being turned inside-out and long-standing donors must change, too” (The Economist 2011). Similarly, Ngaire Woods (2008) talked already in 2008 about a “silent revolution” of emerging donors surreptitiously challenging the established development policies. She states that “[t]he world of development assistance is being shaken by the power shift occurring across the global economy. Emerging economies are quietly beginning to change the rules of the game” (Woods 2008, 1205). This “challenge to the international aid architecture” (Cabral and Weinstock 2010, 1), this “Bedeutungsverlust des traditionellen Geber-Nehmer-Verhältnisses” (Krempin 2014, 16) would then inevitably lead to an adaptation of traditional donors' aid policies as emerging donors perceivably “redefine development theories and practices” (Beaudet, Haslam, and Schafer 2012, 529). The fourth branch of arguments summarises the stand of literature on this particular point as it is of particular relevance here.

How, then, are the rules of the game altered? Some studies argue that traditional donors need to adapt their aid policies in a way that is more “attuned” with that of Southern providers (Kragelund 2010, 24). The argument here is that, generally, traditional donors’ aid will become more and more like that of emerging donors (Goldstein et al. 2006; Walshe Roussel 2013). Others argue that emerging donors are undergoing a process of adapting their policies to Western standards (Wissenbach 2012; Urbina-Ferretjans and Surender 2013) or simply, that both sides are simultaneously adapting their aid to the other’s model, as Christine Hackenesch argues in her study on China and the European Union (Hackenesch 2009). Peter Baker (July 30, 2015) argues for instance that the West will attempt to increasingly sell its aid product as the better alternative to recipients, while others contend that it might increase the interest of traditional donors in neglected recipient areas (Tull 2008) or that traditional donors will attempt a better coordination within their own group in order to remain competitive with emerging donors (Carbone 2011b, 119). When it comes to concrete examples of this adaptation, most studies remain silent.

One potential consequence that the literature has addressed is a shift in sectoral selection from traditional donors. The argument is that donors might think twice before choosing a particular sector that they support. The underlying question is whether traditional donors shift their focus again towards infrastructure or whether they focus their aid on soft sectors and leave the hard policies to emerging donors. These questions are highly interesting but are only raised occasionally (Brautigam 2009, 134–35; Kragelund 2010; Brautigam August 2011). However, the following two consequences that are envisioned by research seem to be more interesting to investigate.

The reaction that is most predicted, and where some empirical evidence is available, investigates the likely increase within trilateral projects – projects between a Northern donor, a Southern provider and a recipient country. Most studies simply state that an increase thereof is likely as a result of emerging donors (Langendorf 2012, 21; Abdenur and Da Fonseca, João Moura Estevão Marques 2013; Mawdsley 2010; Brautigam 2011a; Chaturvedi 2012; Dreher, Fuchs, and Nunnenkamp 2013; Hackenesch 2013; Li and Bonschab 2012; Rosengren, de Roquefeuil, and Bilal 2013; Sidiropoulos 2011). Some studies exist that look at specific trilateral cooperation projects, notably the book from Julia Langendorf et al. (Langendorf et al. 2012). Trilateral cooperation is then often seen as a way for Northern donors to maintain a certain influence on recipients, but also on emerging donors (Davies 2007, 97–99). Adriana Abdenur and Joao Da Fonseca (2013, 1488) argue that trilateral cooperation is therefore thought to be embedded in the general struggle “over political, economic and security spaces”. Trilateral cooperation might also lead to “developing the full potentials of South-South Cooperation” (Morazán et al. 2012, 37). While many state that this cooperation is desirable, others point to potential problems within trilateral cooperation – for instance, Maurizio Carbone (2011a) points at problems between China and the European Union because of a different understanding of the terms of triangular cooperation (for an analysis of the general problems emerging from trilateral projects, see Altenburg and Weikert 2006, 2007). Moreover, Hackenesch (2013) notices that while on the rhetorical level of governments many talk about trilateral projects, very rarely are such projects implemented in practice.

The second consequence involves possibly the most dramatic alteration in Western aid policy – the field of conditionality. The field of (especially political) conditionality is considered to be the most striking distinction between emerging and traditional donors. The logical conclusion that is

then often drawn by the literature is that this particular field will also be most profoundly affected when it comes to changes in traditional donors' aid. Most studies limit themselves to stating that traditional donors, such as the World Bank and the IMF, fear that their conditionality might be undermined by emerging donors (H. Campbell 2008). Similarly, Deborah Brautigam (2008, 31) argues that emerging donors challenge the concept of conditionality and that implicitly the West seems to agree that the concept is outdated. Further studies state that, for now, aid levels of emerging donors might still be too low to truly change the concept of conditionality, but that this might be the case if funds further increase (Kragelund 2010, 19–20; Brautigam August 2011, 2011b).

Some very limited reactions have been studied empirically regarding conditionality: first, some have argued that the Chinese presence in Africa has compromised the ability of the European Union and of the United States to push for good governance projects in Africa (Hackenesch 2009; Wissenbach 2011a, 2011b, 2009; Wu 2012). Some general studies argue that through the emergence of new donors, the power of aid conditionality overall has been diminished (Carbonnier and Sumner 2012, 4; Ssenyange 2010; Lyman 2006). Most of these studies are however rather short policy directing papers or devote only a small number of pages to the question of the consequences and only tentatively point towards this possible result. No study has so far truly assessed the empirical consequences in the field of conditionality. Peter Baker, in an article of the New York Times, argued that the tone in Obama's Africa visit in 2010 was less confrontational because of the Chinese presence there (Baker, July 30, 2015). Nevertheless, his empirical evidence is restricted to a few statements in Obama's official speech. Uwe Wissenbach (2012, 171–74) looks at the reaction from the European Union and comes to the conclusion that its attitude towards conditionality has softened (from imposing to rewarding conditionality), coupled with an increased focus on ownership which is not dissimilar to the Chinese rhetoric. He argues that the EU attempts to engage with China in order to avoid direct competition. But again, the empirical analysis is rather limited when it comes to analysing the real consequences of emerging donors for traditional donor conditionality.

In conclusion, then, while some studies address the question of the consequences for traditional donors in their research, most are content to simply state that emerging donors are a relevant challenge to the existing aid regime.

The aim of this paper is therefore clear: to shed some light on the empirical consequences caused by emerging donors upon the two selected countries and on their development assistance policies regarding aid conditionality. This study is therefore a much needed contribution to recent debates and gives some empirically driven answers to questions that are often posed but equally often left unanswered.

3 Theoretical and methodological approaches

3.1 Theoretical framework of institutional change

This paper asks whether the activities of emerging donors trigger any change in the United States' and the United Kingdom's stand on conditionality. It further investigates what kind of change is taking place.

This section gives answers to the question of how that potential change can be identified. To embed these investigations in a theoretical setting, this paper chooses an institutional framework for the following reasons: first, the development policies of the United Kingdom and the United States can be easily framed as institutions, composed of three distinctive layers, following the works of Vivien Lowndes and Mark Roberts (2013). Second, institutional approaches are best suited for explaining change that takes place in a particular policy field, such as development assistance (J. L. Campbell 2004).

But how do we identify change within the development institution of the United Kingdom and the United States? First, one has to make assumptions on what aspect of the institution in question changes. Institutions can be divided into rules, practices and narratives (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 200–201). Rules are formally constructed or recorded items, such as laws or contracts. In the field of development aid, rules can be found in official aid contracts and in the policies decided upon by the governments of both donors (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 53–57). Practices are demonstrated through conduct and behaviour. Regarding the development discourse, practices can be found for instance in official meetings and aid projects (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 57–63). Finally, narratives are expressed through speeches and other publications (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 63–69).¹

What kind of change is likely to occur? Theory divides into incremental and exogenous change. An exogenous change takes place when abrupt and radical change takes place (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 202). This kind of change would imply a radical change from the current situation in which for instance both donors would decide to stop all development assistance. As it is highly unlikely that such a radical change occurs, I use the concept of incremental change for this study.

This paper does not only identify change, it especially seeks to understand how the institutional change occurs. In order to categorise the diversity of institutional changes that might occur, this paper refers to the mechanisms of change as identified by James Mahoney and Thelen (2010) and Wolfgang Streeck and Thelen (2005): layering, displacement, drift, conversion and exhaustion. The mechanisms of *layering* (Schickler 2001) and *displacement* (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 31) refer to changes of institutions where a reinterpretation of the institution is difficult and new rules need to be introduced to trigger change. Layering refers to a mechanism where new rules are introduced while old rules remain in place. Displacement describes a change process where existing rules are replaced by new rules. The mechanisms of *conversion* (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 26–29), *drift* (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 31) and *exhaustion* refer to changes in institutions where a reinterpretation of the institution is relatively easy. For change, no new rules are introduced, rather the meaning (or narrative and practice) of the rules changes. It can either lose in importance (drift and exhaustion) or simply change in meaning (conversion). These mechanisms allow for a more visualised image of the changes that take place on the level of the layers of the United Kingdom's and the United States development policies.

The institutional framework allows us to identify changes on several layers. It is argued here that changes within the narrative of an institution are easiest whereas rules and especially practices tend more towards path-dependent (and change resistant) behaviour and that change is likelier to occur

¹ Note that the layers of narratives and rules are often intertwined.

in areas that are rather new policies rather than in old established fields, such as conditionality. The following hypotheses summarise this:

H1: Change is more likely to occur on the layer of narratives than it is on the layer of rules or practices.

H2: Long established policy fields are more likely to be susceptible to path dependent behaviour and less influenced by reformative ideas than newer established policy fields.

3.2 Notes on methods

This section defines the studied time frame, the analysed materials, as well as the methodological approach. In order to study institutional change, it is important to identify a specific time frame in which change might occur (J. L. Campbell 2004, 41–47). While most of the emerging donors have been active in development assistance for several decades (Yu 2010), their real impact evolved together with their increasing economic output (Cheru and Obi 2010, 5–6). Coupled with their economic growth came also a self-awareness of their role in development assistance (an example for China is the White Paper on its foreign aid policies towards Africa or the first FOCAC summit in 2006, see Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006). These events led among others to the recognition of their importance by traditional donors.

In order to study institutional change within the rules and narratives of the development policies of the two donors, this paper analyses publications (official documents, publications and press releases) from the United States and the United Kingdom. These documents are analysed in depth through a content analysis. For the analytical parts of the paper, I looked at diverse key words in order to find policy changes indicated in the official documents.

In order to study the changes on the layers of the practices, a more targeted approach is needed: The practices are looked at in 11 selected countries where traditional donors share an interest with at least three emerging donors. This selection consists of countries where both donors were active over the last ten years (the first two columns indicating the rank each recipient reached on average over the period from 2004 to 2014). All recipients are at least in the top 20 of recipients, with the exception of Malawi.² While the involvement of emerging donors varies considerably more than that of traditional donors, what is important for this analysis is whether their presence is significant for traditional donors. Another finding can be drawn from the table: all but one recipient are located in Africa indicating the strong regional focus of all considered donors – emerging or traditional.

Table 3-1: Selection of case studies to illustrate practices of traditional donors

<i>Recipient country</i>	<i>USA</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>China</i>	<i>India</i>	<i>Brazil</i>	<i>South Africa</i>
<i>Afghanistan</i>	2	4	Yes	Yes	Yes	No

² Malawi was selected because of a considerable involvement of all emerging donors as well as of two traditional donors (Malawi).

<i>DRC</i>	11	9	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Ethiopia</i>	4	3	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
<i>Malawi</i>	33	12	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Mozambique</i>	16	16	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Nigeria</i>	10	1	Yes	Yes	Yes	(Yes)
<i>Sudan/South Sudan</i> ³	3	10	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Tanzania</i>	15	8	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Uganda</i>	14	13	Yes	Yes	(Yes)	Yes
<i>Zambia</i>	18	15	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Source: OECD stats and sources for emerging donors (see literature review for details)⁴

4 Changes within the policies regarding human rights conditionality?

Olav Stokke defines conditionality as “the use of pressure by the donor, in terms of threatening to terminate aid or actually terminating or reducing it, if conditions are not met by the recipient” (Stokke 1995, 12).⁵ Several distinctions are useful for understanding conditionality in full: first, conditions can be imposed by the donor before (*ex ante*) or after (*ex post*) the disbursement of funds. Second, conditions can derive from political objectives or from economic considerations. The literature considers the aid of emerging and traditional donors to be largely different in regard to political conditions. Therefore, this paper singularly focuses on the political conditionality regarding human rights. Conditionality is expected to be swayed by the emergence of new donors because emerging donors do not make use of conditionality (or are perceived to refrain from conditionality), which conceivably challenges this policy. Theoretically, conditionality is a well-established, traditional field of development cooperation. Following hypothesis 2, conditionality is therefore more prone to path-dependent behaviour and is unlikely to change abruptly.

³ Note that the rankings are only for Sudan before the separation into Sudan and South Sudan in 2011.

⁴ Good indications for China, Brazil and India come for instance from (African Economic Outlook 2011; Kragelund 2010; Morazán et al. 2012, 17; for information about Chinese projects in Africa, see Paulo and Reisen 2010, 542; Brautigam 2011b; AidData). Note that statements in brackets indicate that imply a very modest engagement.

⁵ Note that this paper does not have the purpose of discussing whether any kind of conditionality is useful for the process of development. There seems to be a significant debate going on in the literature about that topic (see for instance, Öhler, Nunnenkamp, and Dreher 2012; Börzel and Hackensch 2013; Sorensen 1995; Dietrich 2013; Vanheukelom 2012).

Each section devoted to a particular country first discusses the main narratives on conditionality in the field of human rights and later identifies whether these official narratives have been implemented in the rules and practices of the individual institutions of development cooperation.⁶

The following sections address the following questions: (1) what is each country's approach towards conditionality during the observed period, (2) does a change in conditionality regarding human rights take place within the narratives, rules and practices of the aid institutions and (3) to what extent is this change related to the emergence of new donors.

4.1 United States: Approach towards human rights: more selective?

The following analysis takes a closer look, first at the narratives within the United States surrounding conditionality in its human rights policies. The second part confronts these narratives with the implementation in rules and practices.

4.1.1 The narratives within US policies regarding human rights

The promotion of human rights is seen as an “integral component of foreign policy” and thus by extension as a “key tool” of development cooperation (USDS 2009a, 1–2; Dobriansky 05.05.2005, 2). Human rights are considered to be an “American tradition” and the US sees its own responsibility as a democracy to promote the protection of these rights anywhere in the world (USDS 2012a, 1; Dobriansky 05.05.2005, 1). Protecting human rights is seen as protecting US national security and embedded in the National Security Strategy since 2002 (USDS AR HR Intro 2004: 1; USDS AR HR Intro 2011: 6; USWH National security strategy 2010: 5). Human rights-friendly countries are considered to be better cooperation partners, more stable and more peaceful (USDS 2005, 2). The United States is seen in the leading position in “upholding and protecting the values that define America” (USDS 2010c, 10). While the US is careful to stress that it is not “impos[ing] [its] values on other countries by force”, it maintains the belief that the values are “cherished by people in every nation” (USDS 2010c, 10). Hence, human rights are considered to be core values of American society and a cornerstone of its foreign policy. Are these seen as endangered by emerging donors?

Within the United States government, a lot of effort has been put into the analysis of the effect China's support of other nations might have on their human rights record (Christensen 03.08.2006, 42; USDS 03.04.2012, 393; Kerry 04.11.2014, 2). In 2008, the US resumed the human rights dialogue with China (USDS 2010a, 27). While the US criticises the human rights abuses that are taking place in China, they are also wary of the potential impact China's approach towards human rights could have on their own promotion of human rights (Shear 13.01.2010, 2). Ms Carolyn Bartholomew, Commissioner of the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, states in 2012:

“My former boss, Ms. Pelosi, used to always say she was the skunk at the garden party when she would meet with foreign leaders because she would be raising concerns about human rights abuses. So I believe that we would continue to do that. I believe that the Chinese

⁶ This division is due to the hypothesis from the theoretical chapter that the layer of narratives is more likely to change than the layers of rules and practices.

Government is not doing that. But I think we need to step up our game in terms of reaching out and hosting delegations” (Bartholomew 29.03.2012, 46).

This indicates that the US plans to uphold and strengthen their human rights initiatives, even if it anticipates that “African countries can depend on China to avoid raising controversial human rights issues in the U.N. Human Rights Council, and on occasion, to even support them when they are criticized by Western countries” (Shinn 29.03.2012, 73). It seems therefore that the intention to strengthen human rights in the selective criteria is closely linked to the assumption that China might work in the opposite direction. The US therefore attempts – through a more conditional approach – to balance the “Chinese pragmatism” which is thought to imply that countries no longer intervene in other countries’ internal affairs, a policy which is considered to be “immoral” (Blumenthal 03.08.2006, 272–73). The next section then evaluates whether this strong and increasing conditionality in human rights is applied in the rules and practices.

4.1.2 Is the US approach regarding human rights more selective in rules and practices?

The following paragraphs investigate the disbursements to these 11 selected case studies over the period of ten years and ask whether the increase in conditionality that was noticeable in the layers of narratives and general rules is also present in the layer of practices.

The narrative surrounding human rights treated the promotion of human rights as an integral aspect of US foreign policy. The following section asks if this commitment has been accompanied by a relevant shift in the rules and in the funding and whether or not the selective criteria are applied in US development cooperation.

Formally, US development cooperation of any institution – USAID or the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) or any other⁷ – is required to abstain from distributing money to “any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognised human rights” (U.S. Government July 2003, 59–60). Within the selective criteria of the MCC, political and civil rights are indicators to rate potential candidates. Many of the indicators assessing the suitability of candidates for MCC funds relate to human rights.⁸

Especially in the first category, many indicators look at the respect of political rights (indicators for political and civil rights, but also indicator of the rule of law or the freedom of information). The second and third category strongly emphasise the importance of economic, social and cultural rights (access to health, education, gender equality). Moreover, since 2012, each successful candidate must pass either the threshold in political or in civil rights. Therefore, the importance attached to the respect of civil and political rights has increased in the last ten years (MCC 2012, 20, 2015). Similarly, in 2010, the US state department changed the position of Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs to the position of Under Secretary for Civilian Security,

⁷ Note that the MCC and USAID are the main agencies disbursing aid. The MCC is particularly relevant for the research question as it propagates a more selective approach in its policies with strong selective criteria that potential candidates have to fulfil.

⁸ There exist three broad categories for which candidates are evaluated: (1) ruling justly; (2) investing in people; and (3) encouraging economic freedom. Generally, the number of indicators has increased from 16 in 2004 to 21 in 2015 (MCC 2015, 1–11, 2004, 9–10).

Democracy, and Human rights, as human rights are seen as “a key priority that reflects American values” (USDS 2010c, 42–43). Overall, the rules have born growing testament to the conditionality of foreign aid even though the initial importance of human rights was already present in 2002. What, then, about the practices?

Within the US budget on foreign aid, the section democracy, human rights and governance is particularly relevant here. Within that category, one indicator is dedicated to human rights and the rule of law alone. Over the last ten years, significant amounts have been transferred through this account. A steady increase took place until 2013 (up to USD 1 billion) with a slight decrease in 2014 (USD 636 million) (USDS 2008, 2009b, 2010b, 2011, 2012b, 2013, 2014). In percentage terms this amounts to an average of 2.4 percent spent on the promotion of human rights and the rule of law within the foreign aid budget with peaks in relative terms of 3 percent in 2012 and 2013. This amounts to a decent share within the budget and is comparable to the amounts spent by the UK. Moreover, with the increasing share within the budget, first general figures seem to confirm the increasing narrative on the importance of human rights policies.

In order to assess whether the US also applies its narrative when it comes to being more selective with its aid recipients in terms of respect for human rights, two indicators are used here: first, we look at the main destinations of US aid and compare those with the ratification of the most important human rights treaties. Second, we focus on the indicator for rule of law (from the *World Governance Indicators*, see Appendix 1) within the 11 selected recipients and whether US spending on these countries is consistent with the positive or negative trends of the rule of law indicator.

The UN office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights rates countries depending on their ratification of the most important human rights treaties. The scale is divided into four groups whereby the lowest section is for countries that have ratified below four treaties, the highest category is for countries that have ratified more than 15 human rights treaties. The United States, arguing in its narrative strongly for the defence of human rights, scores itself only in the second category for countries that have ratified in between five and nine human rights treaties. It is thereby in the lowest category of our three donors as Norway and the United Kingdom are both in the third category (having ratified 10 to 14 human rights treaties). Moreover, the United States is in the same category as India and most interestingly China which it criticises highly for human rights violations. It equally scores below South Africa (10 to 14 ratifications) and Brazil (the only country represented here with more than 15 ratifications).

What about the biggest recipients of US aid? Iraq and Afghanistan (first and second biggest recipients) score both above the United States with 10 to 14 ratifications. Similarly, Nigeria (tenth biggest recipient), the Democratic Republic of Congo (eleventh biggest recipient), Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique (respectively 14th, 15th and 16th biggest recipient) as well as Malawi (33rd biggest recipient) have all ratified 10 to 14 human rights treaties and thereby more than the United States itself. From the selected cases above, Sudan, Ethiopia (third and fourth biggest recipients) as well as Zambia (18th biggest recipients) are in a similarly low position than the United States with 5 to 9 ratifications.⁹ Moreover, the United States funds substantial amounts to South Sudan

⁹ Other top recipients also are in this low category of 5 to 9 ratifications: Pakistan (fifth biggest recipient), Kenya (sixth biggest recipient), Palestine (seventh biggest recipient) and Jordan (eight biggest recipient). Moreover, Colombia (ninth biggest recipient) is in the category above the United States itself (10 to 14 ratifications).

that has (so far) only up to four human rights treaties ratifications and scores in the lowest category. This first indication seems to contradict a higher preselection in US aid.

Another relevant way to measure the commitment to implementing the human rights condition in aid distributions is to look at the Worldwide Governance Indicators provided by the World Bank. The indicator *rule of law* assesses the human rights situation in recipient countries. This indicator “reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the policy, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (World Governance indicators). The indicator varies on a scale from 0 points to 100 (top performers). When looking at the Worldwide Governance Indicators for the rule of law, one notices that increased levels of the rule of law indicator do not necessarily indicate a higher spending of US aid. Top US recipients, like for instance Afghanistan, Sudan, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, all have a rule of law score of below 10 points. Nigeria scores slightly better with an average of 11.56 points, but still presides over a dire human rights record. All these countries receive funding to improve their human rights records. In Afghanistan, for instance, the percentage spent on the promotion of human rights increased from 3 percent in 2006 of the overall amount spent to nearly 14 percent in 2010. For the Democratic Republic of Congo, only 2 percent is spent on average for improving the rule of law, which is similarly low in the case of South Sudan which receives 2.2 percent for the rule of law. The cases of Sudan and Nigeria are even lower with an average spending of 0.10 (Sudan) and 0.16 percent (Nigeria).

Countries that fare rather well on the rule of law indicator are Ethiopia (average of 29.58 points, increasing trend since 2009), Uganda (with 41.82 points on average, increasing trend overall) and Zambia (average of slightly above 39 points, increasing trend since 2010). These improving records on the rule of law indicator are not necessarily matched with increasing amounts of aid spending as the case of Ethiopia shows: its rule of law indicator improved from 23.7 points in 2009 to 38.9 points in 2014, while spending decreased from 3.1 percent in 2010 to 2.42 percent in 2014. Sometimes, an increase in the rule of law indicator is matched with an increase in funds. This is the case for Zambia where a slight increase has taken place in the last four years. Similarly, Uganda’s increase in the rule of law indicator are met with an increasing of funds from 1.28 percent in 2004 and 1.71 percent in 2014.

Another group of countries equally has comparably high scores for the rule of law indicator but with slightly decreasing tendencies (Malawi with an average of 49.63 points and a slightly decreasing trend since 2009, Mozambique with 31.95 points on average and a decreasing tendency since 2010, and Tanzania (average of 40.60 points, slightly decreasing tendencies since 2004). The aid practices illustrate that these decreasing trends are not met with aid cuts but on the contrary with increasing funds (an increase for Malawi from receiving 0.37 percent of US aid in 2008 to 0.76 percent in 2013, for Mozambique a doubling of aid percentage from roughly 1 percent in 2008 to 2 percent in 2013). Similarly, funding for Tanzania has almost quadrupled despite from 2004 to 2014 (from 0.55 percent to 1.85 percent) despite its decreasing scores in the rule of law indicator.

The human rights situation in Sudan was critical during the Darfur crisis. In 2005, the United States claimed that they attempted to influence the Sudanese government and militia leaders through

diplomatic pressure, media interviews and multilateral engagement (USDS 08.12.2005, 1). Similarly, in 2004, they said that they were funding mostly local groups and the private sector to avoid human rights violations (for instance through death by stoning) (USDS 2004, 272). The rule of law indicator for Sudan is therefore unsurprisingly low for the whole period with the lowest points in 2005 but generally with an increase in the indicators (even though they remain at a low 9.48 points in 2014). US funding to Sudan was highest during the time when the rule of law indicator was lowest (from 2005 till 2010) with above 3.5 percent of US aid. Since then the aid to Sudan has decreased to 0.93 percent (in 2014) despite rising levels in the rule of law indicator. This decrease was however met by the funding to the newly founded South Sudan that received increasing funding from an initial 0.21 percent in 2011 to 2.89 percent in 2014. Again, this increase in funding to South Sudan cannot be explained by an improvement in the human rights situation as the rule of law indicator has constantly decreased (from an initial 5.63 points in 2011 to 1.00 points in 2014).

From the eleven countries studied here, only two (Zambia and Uganda) show a consistency between the rhetoric and the practices while all the others indicate a deviation from the practices.¹⁰ This section has illustrated that despite a vocal rhetoric on supporting countries that foster human rights, the practices indicate that other factors play a significant role in the distribution of aid and that strict pre-selective criteria that were advocated for in the narratives and in the rules are not strictly implemented in practice.

4.2 United Kingdom's policy regarding human rights: more selective?

The following analysis takes a closer look, first at the narratives within the United Kingdom surrounding conditionality in human rights policies. The second part confronts these narratives with the implementation in rules and practices.

4.2.1 The narratives within UK policies regarding human rights

The UK's department for international development (DFID) claims to have significantly changed its approach towards conditionality with 2006 referred to as a turning point for a "new approach", lowering conditionality to the benefit of ownership (DFID 2006a, 151).¹¹

As in the cases of the United States, human rights are considered to be an important policy tool for the United Kingdom. The narrative refers to governments that respect human rights as being likelier to observe their international obligations and to be peaceful and secure states (DFID 2005b,

¹⁰ Shannon Blanton and David Cingranelli (2012) also argue that the United States has a very ambiguous relationship towards the role of human rights in their aid allocation (for a similar argument, see Breuning and Linebarger 2012; Hoeffler and Outram 2011; Easterly and Williamson 2011). Other studies find that human rights play a role in development assistance since the end of the Cold War, but without a clear positive relationship between aid giving and human rights standards (Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009). The United States is not alone, however, in this neglect of rewarding or punishing human rights policies, as Richard Nielsen (2013) shows.

¹¹ This reform process is confirmed by the DAC Peer Review (2006, 74) which also states that the reform needs clarification.

8–9; Browne 24.04.2012, 7). Supporting human rights activities is therefore seen to be in the self-interest of the UK ((DFID 2011, 25).

Respecting human rights is included in the four partnership commitments that a recipient needs to fulfil before the delivery of British aid.¹² These partnership commitments were introduced in 2005 (as *Partnerships for poverty reduction: rethinking conditionality*; (DFID 2005b)). This policy foresaw the conclusion of a contract between recipients and the UK before aid is delivered. In this contract, recipients have to commit to three partnership conditions: first, a commitment to poverty reduction and to reaching the Millennium Development Goals; second, a commitment to human rights and upholding other international obligations; and finally the obligation to strengthening financial management and accountability (DFID 2005b, iii; 1; 8). Monitoring and benchmarks increased since the introduction of the policy in 2005 (DFID May 2009, 2014a, 2012a, 6). The pre-selective mechanism should assure that UK aid does not reach countries where massive human rights violations occur (example of Democratic Republic of Congo where sanctions worked, DFID 2006b, 221; for further support of sanctions, see DFID 2011, 135).

Human rights are a topic where the UK largely agrees to disagree with emerging donors. The Foreign Office Minister, Jeremy Browne, insisted in a speech in 2012 that, despite criticism from the BRICS summits, human rights should not be considered a Western product but a universal phenomenon (Hague 14.02.2012, 2). Similarly, the Foreign Secretary, William Hague, listed human rights as a challenge in the cooperation with emerging donors:

“But at the same time these changes [rise of emerging powers] pose challenges that we need to overcome. One of these is a difference of opinion over how we protect human rights in other countries” (Hague 14.02.2012, 3).

While the Foreign Ministry seemed to put a stronger emphasis on the differences between emerging donors and the UK when it comes to human rights, the Minister for Development, Andrew Mitchell, stressed that differences regarding human rights

“don’t mean we shouldn’t put our global heads together, work for development and, where we agree, cooperate” (Mitchell 15.02.2011, 3).

The tension has therefore not been resolved in the observed period, but it is clear for both the Ministry for International Development and the Foreign Office that cooperation is easier with “like-minded” countries, such as South Africa or Brazil (DFID 2011, 6-7; 26).

The analysis shows a strengthening in the narrative of human rights related conditions as more and more pre-selective conditions have been attached to British aid since 2004. Moreover, it shows that the UK is very aware of the differences with emerging donors in the understanding of human rights, but prefers to uphold the standards while cooperating as much as possible with emerging donors.

¹² Political and civil rights are included in partnership commitments 2 and 4, whereas economic, social and cultural rights are underlying the partnership commitments 1 and 3.

4.2.2 Has the British approach become more selective regarding human rights in rules and practices?

The following section concentrates on the rules and practices of the United Kingdom's development policies. Some of the main rules were already mentioned earlier, such as the partnership commitments. These partnership commitments have strongly increased in selectivity.

The section on narratives already mentioned that partnership commitments include relevant human rights as preconditions to entering into an aid relationship. Simultaneously, since 2004, monitoring has increased to spot and sanction human rights violations. Therefore, the narrative is closely linked to this rule. The question that remains, then, is whether these rules are implemented in practice – are political and civil rights, as well as socio-economic rights a precondition for receiving British aid? The list of what conditions have to be fulfilled in order to apply for UK aid has increased as the narrative section illustrates, including a “Practical guide about how to monitor efficiently and compile a decent human rights assessment with not too much effort”) (DFID 2009, 13–17).

Human rights are held up as a “priority area” within British narratives on development aid. There is no separated reporting on human rights spending in the UK. DFID explains this through the widespread inclusion of human rights aspects in many of its activities (DFID 2014b, 26). The total amount spent by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) on human rights includes spending for staff, project work, and bilateral funds. For 2014, the total amounts to 38.2 million British pounds (roughly 60 million USD) (DFID 2014b, 26–29). This number has increased dramatically since 2005, when spending amounted to 13.4 million British pounds (DFID 2005a, 18).

In the early years of this study, human rights spending was directed through the Global Opportunities Fund, of 3.5 million British pounds went to human rights, democracy and good governance programmes in 2005. A specific human rights fund has been wound down over the years (USDS 2005, 18) and replaced by the human rights and democracy programme which spent 6.5 million British pounds on human rights projects in 2013 and 2014 (DFID 2012b, 24, 2013, 24).

Priority countries are either countries of concern or countries that offer opportunities to promote and protect human rights. This overall priority has not changed since 2005 (USDS 2005, 16). In 2014, recipients of UK support that are located within the eleven selected countries are Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sudan and South Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia – basically all except Uganda, Malawi and Mozambique (DFID 2014b, 26.30).

It does not seem surprising that the UK has an interest in fostering human rights projects in Afghanistan where other emerging donors are also active. The UK supports projects that try to prevent sexual violence in conflict-affected countries (DFID 2014b, 27). The UK also attempts to strengthen civil society and human rights through a project where it currently spends 20 million British pounds (30.5 million USD) since 2010 (UK Development tracker Afghanistan). Most of the sector aid is distributed to social infrastructure and services, indicating a focus on supporting political structures (OECD Stat 2015). Similarly, the UK supports projects trying to achieve

universal primary education in South Sudan. The highest share, in terms of sectors from UK aid is distributed towards humanitarian aid, but social infrastructure and service come second. The same applies to Sudan (OECD Stat 2015). In Uganda and Tanzania, the highest amounts are spent on social infrastructure and services as well as on energy infrastructure for Uganda (OECD Stat 2015). In Tanzania, a human rights related project has been at work since 2012, distributing a total of 4.5 million British pounds (around 6.8 million USD). This project concentrates on providing women with legal services and supporting the 2015 election in Tanzania (UK Development tracker Tanzania human rights programme).

Moreover, the UK uses various instruments in co-operation with the United Nations Security Council and the European Union to punish human rights abusers worldwide (freezing their assets for instance). In 2014, this policy was applied to individuals in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (both countries where China has strong interests) (DFID 2014b, 84).

The UK itself is in a relatively high category with 10 to 14 ratification (the same category as Norway and above the United States). From its major 20 aid recipients, 13 countries have ratified an equally high amount of human right treaties¹³. All remaining seven countries have ratified between 5 and 9 human right treaties, from which India (6.44 percent) and Ethiopia (4.08 percent) are the most important recipients.¹⁴

What is the record for the UK in rewarding or punishing good performers in the rule of law indicator of the World Bank? Similar to the United States, the UK still disburses considerable amounts to countries that have a very low indicator in the rule of law (like Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and Sudan). There are some countries where the UK seems to implement its rhetoric of punishing bad and rewarding good performers: Ethiopia is a case where positive trends in the rule of law indicator was met with increased British spending. Similarly, the case of Tanzania indicates that a bad record in the rule of law indicator is punished with lower amounts of aid.

Similar to the US, there are also cases where the UK shows only a very weak reaction to supposedly strong trends in their recipients' indicators: as such, Afghanistan and the DRC receive a stable amount of money despite slightly improving (and slightly decreasing respectively) records. Similarly, Malawi and Mozambique receive relatively stable funding despite severe (for Mozambique) and moderate (for Malawi) decreases in the rule of law indicator. Moreover, Uganda's improving records are not met with an increase in spending but with a slight decrease in spending. Finally, there is one group where the UK seems to ignore its narrative on stronger selectivity: this group consists of the cases of Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan and Zambia. In the cases of Nigeria, Sudan and Zambia the increasing records in the rule of law indicator were met with severe decreases in aid. On the other hand, the bad performer South Sudan received increased amounts of funding.

¹³ These are in order of importance: Nigeria (8.33 percent of aid), Afghanistan (3.83 percent), Bangladesh (3.44 percent), Iraq (3.23 percent), Tanzania (3.17 percent), DRC (2.82 percent), Ghana (2.05 percent), Malawi (1.75 percent), Uganda (1.66 percent), Mozambique (1.48 percent), Sierra Leone (1.29 percent), Nepal (1.28 percent) and Rwanda (1.19 percent).

¹⁴ The remaining five countries are, in order of importance Pakistan (3.17 percent), Sudan (2.13 percent), Kenya (1.58 percent), Zambia (1.52 percent) and Zimbabwe (1.31 percent).

This section indicates that practices on human rights policies have increased since 2004, and that more money is spent on enforcing these conditions. This is also true in countries where the UK is a direct rival of emerging donors that do not include human rights in their portfolio. Nevertheless, the section also showed that the UK is still far away from a totally consistent application of its pre-selective criteria and of truly rewarding or punishing good or bad human right performers.

5 Conclusion: Change within conditionality regarding human rights?

This paper looked at the policy field of human rights conditionality and asked whether the two selected traditional donors adapt their policies because of emerging donors. This section summarizes the findings and asks which common denominators there are between the reaction of the United States and the United Kingdom.

Both countries pushed for a more selective approach in their narratives and in their rules (for the USA especially with the introduction of the MCC, for the UK with the introduction of the partnership commitments). The sections on the practices of this implementation of these rules and narratives have shown that they are not always applied in the practices in countries where both donors share an interest with emerging donors.

Theoretically, it was argued that human rights conditionality is a well-established field in development cooperation where any change would be met by huge resistance from veto players. This can partly explain the inconsistency between the changes within the layers of narratives and rules and that of practices – where arguably change would arrive last and be most difficult to achieve. When we refer to the mechanisms that explain change, a process of layering has taken place here with new elements (stronger selectivity) being implemented in the narratives and rules but not yet implemented (or only partially) within the layer of practices.

Other explanatory factors might play a role in explaining the inertia within the aid practices: the direct contact of emerging donors might also be able to explain why policy makers decided to maintain aid relationships even in countries where its narratives and rules would no longer allow for the disbursement of aid. Moreover, future studies would need to look at the practices at countries where emerging donors are not that present in order to make an assessment about their influence on the change in conditionality.

6 Appendix: World Governance Indicators for chosen recipients

Recipient country	Voice and accountability	Government effectiveness	Regulatory quality	Rule of law	Control of corruption
<i>Afghanistan</i>	12.46 ↘ (-0.1156)	6.85 ↘ (-0.4412)	5.82 ↑ (0.8341)	0.95 → (0.0213)	2.19 → (0.0902)
<i>DRC</i>	8.45 ↗ (0.2334)	2.28 ↘ (-0.134)	6.54 ↗ (0.1615)	2.52 → (-0.01)	4.43 ↗ (0.1563)
<i>Ethiopia</i>	13.14 ↓ (-0.3496)	35.63 ↑ (1.3179)	17.10 ↘ (-0.1149)	29.58 ↑ (0.9474)	30.48 ↑ (1.063)
<i>Malawi</i>	39.56 ↑ (0.9786)	32.55 ↑ (1.0718)	31.13 ↓ (-0.7985)	49.63 ↘ (-0.2384)	34.96 ↗ (0.4328)
<i>Mozambique</i>	44.66 ↓ (-0.847)	33.54 ↓ (-1.0437)	34.54 ↑ (0.8033)	31.95 ↓ (-0.8476)	35.30 ↘ (-0.4525)
<i>Nigeria</i>	26.95 ↗ (0.2496)	14.65 ↘ (-0.3896)	22.38 ↑ (1.1118)	11.56 ↗ (0.2334)	12.26 ↘ (-0.1616)
<i>South Sudan</i>	11.50 ↓ (-4.289)	2.40 ↗ (0.2949)	4.54 ↗ (0.2934)	3.91 ↓ (-1.4375)	2.40 → (0.0156)
<i>Sudan</i>	4.47 ↘ (-0.1778)	7.24 ↓ (-0.5495)	7.78 ↘ (-0.4401)	7.57 ↑ (0.5741)	4.73 ↘ (-0.3919)
<i>Tanzania</i>	41.77 ↑ (0.5208)	35.63 ↓ (-1.8104)	37.82 ↗ (0.2487)	40.60 ↓ (-0.7639)	34.04 ↓ (-1.8481)
<i>Uganda</i>	31.47 → (0.084)	36.96 ↓ (-0.6493)	47.23 ↓ (-1.0105)	41.82 ↑ (0.6646)	19.42 ↓ (-1.0861)
<i>Zambia</i>	40.61 ↑ (0.8196)	27.05 ↑ (1.9325)	32.79 ↑ (0.6699)	39.01 ↑ (1.1947)	35.30 ↑ (1.9674)

Source: World Bank World Governance Indicators, average between 2004 and 2014 (own calculations)¹⁵

¹⁵ The slope is based on the trendline from the entries of the years 2004 to 2014 and indicates whether it is a positive trend (above 0.5, ↑), a negative trend (below -0.5, ↓), a rather positive trend (between 0.1-0.49, ↗), a rather negative trend (between -0.1 and -0.5, ↘), or rather stable (between 0.09 and -0.09, →).

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