Paper short abstract:

Comparing the ways in which brokers provide access to public services in India and Indonesia, this paper argues that a comparative study of patronage networks can serve to understand the evolving capacity of citizens to hold their politicians to account.

Paper long abstract:

Poorer citizens across particularly the global south often depend on patronage networks to gain access to public services. These networks consist of various kinds of brokers who manipulate the provision of state benefits in exchange for electoral support. The character of these informal networks not only shapes the outcome of elections but also shapes the capacity of citizens to extract benefits from the state.

Benefitting from a rare opportunity to conduct extensive fieldwork on local politics in both countries, this paper compares the nature of such patronage networks in India and Indonesia. To gain access to public services, citizens in both countries rely on a range of different brokers - not only party representatives, but also state representatives, notables and community brokers. The relative prevalence of such brokers differs: in comparison to India's largely party-centred patronage networks, state representatives are more prominent in Indonesia. This paper provides a framework to compare patronage networks in different countries, focussing on the character of the relationship of brokers with politicians and their responsiveness to citizen demands. The main argument of the paper is that such a comparative study of patronage networks can serve to understand the evolving capacity of citizens to hold their politicians to account. The evolution of patronage networks is a little-noticed yet important dimension of democratization processes. When citizens can choose between competing patronage networks consisting of more responsive brokers, politicians and bureaucrats face much stronger pressures to perform.