Paper short abstract:

This paper investigates the bureaucratic politics of negotiation by small states engaged in asymmetrical relations with larger states. Based on fieldwork it studies the negotiating tactics of bureaucratic actors of African state, Benin, when negotiating infrastructure contracts with China.

Paper long abstract:

This paper challenges the assumption that West African francophone countries' dependency on aid and foreign investment necessarily limits their capacity to bargain effectively and exert influence in negotiations with China, as well as the assumption that African bureaucracies are ineffective and passive in their relationship with China. This paper has three specific objectives: (1) it establishes the extent to which the government of Benin has been able to exert influence before, during and after infrastructure negotiations with the Chinese government; (2) it explains this variation by exploring the role of bureaucracies and civil servants, domestic party politics and the political executive, and how they impact negotiating strategems and tactics; (3) it distils new insights into the conditions under which small states exert influence during asymmetric negotiations. In so doing, thisThe study re-evaluates the role of small states in international negotiations, and analyses how negotiation varies within a country and across bureaucracies. By joining up theories of bureaucratic institutionalism with empirical evidence that weaker actors can influence negotiations depending on the structure of their bureaucracies and the roles that sub-levels of bureaucracies play during these negotiations, this paper will show how these parameters impact the negotiation outcome. In so doing, this paper aims to contribute to a small but growing literature on African agency in Africa-China relations.