Paper short abstract:

The politics of aid in Afghanistan since 2001 has been fundamentally shaped by the character of the political system put in place by the December 2001 Bonn Agreement. A crucial lesson from the Afghan case is that where institutional design is concerned, one has typically only one chance to get things right.

Paper long abstract:

The politics of aid in Afghanistan since 2001 has been fundamentally shaped by the character of the political system put in place by the December 2001 Bonn Agreement. A crucial lesson from the Afghan case is that where institutional design is concerned, one has typically only one chance to get things right. Once new institutions are in place, actors will likely emerge with strong interests in preserving them as the status quo, even if the institutions prove to have severely adverse effects on the wellbeing of significant constituencies within a society. Specifically, the Bonn Agreement, while admirable in many respects, left unaddressed key questions relating to the scope and strength of the state, and instead set the scene for the emergence of a neopatrimonial system of entwined bureaucracy and patronage, with the president distributing public offices as a manipulative strategy. Furthermore, low levels of civic trust meant that nepotism was in any case likely, and large inflows of aid provided the fuel for corruption on the part of those holding state offices as positional goods. These outcomes should not be seen as reflecting moral failings on the part of Afghan actors, but rather as rational responses to incentive structures with unforeseen consequences. Winding back from this unfortunate situation is no easy task, and as yet there is little evidence that either the National Unity Government in Afghanistan, or donors in the wider world, have credible solutions to offer. This presentation concludes with some reflections on what might usefully be attempted.