Paper short abstract:

Research on oil governance in Ghana assume that ‘good institutions’ matter more. However, a stronger focus on ‘elite bargain’ offers a better understanding of the shape and function of institutions.

Paper long abstract:

The discourse around Ghana's recent oil and gas discovery has generally been dominated by the 'good institutions' mantra as key to addressing the problems associated with the resource curse. However, new insights from the political settlements perspective show how deeper forms of politics and power relations underpin the capacity of states and commitment of elites to govern natural resources for broad developmental purposes. Applying this frame of analysis to the governance of oil in Ghana, this paper reveals how the changing dynamics of the political settlement in Ghana shaped the forms of institutions to govern oil, including its links with different political coalitions, ideological bias and broader relationships with organised social groups. Through primary data collected from key informant interviews and case studies, this paper shows that the interaction between 'elite incentives' and their broader 'ideology' of oil-led development mediated the forms of institutions to govern oil. Within this context, post discovery efforts to promote 'good institutions' reforms in Ghana's nascent petroleum sector might be misplaced, and could be replaced with a stronger focus on the 'elite bargain' within Ghana's competitive clientelism political settlement, which appears to offer a more appropriate understanding of the shape and function of institutions.