Abstract:

The topic of this paper addresses an important and often understudied area of research, focusing on U.S. Intelligence Failures in Afghanistan, spanning from the beginning of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 to the withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. Success in Afghanistan was heavily dependent on the information provided by the intelligence community, coupled with both military intelligence and various other forms of complex intelligence collection – culture, society, geography, health, and agriculture. Further, it is important to note that in the case of intelligence failures in Afghanistan, often, policymakers did not heavily rely on the Intelligence Communities assessments of on-the-ground information, their minds were closed on the matter, leading to clear failures. I argue that a clear lack of understanding regarding the complexities of the region, combined with a lack of strategy, culminated in both military and intelligence failures in Afghanistan. I utilize a three-pronged framework in an attempt to understand the three key intelligence challenges in the case of Afghanistan. The first and notably the most critical challenge for the Intelligence Community was the discrepancies in the amount of knowledge that was needed on issues in Afghanistan versus the amount that was readily available. The second challenge that was presented was the complexity of coordination and cooperation between international actors and other allies. As many intelligence experts point out, many complexities arose during coordination efforts between international allies such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN), and the U.S. The Intelligence to these complexities, the Intelligence Community was unable to formulate a cohesive strategy and operational structures. Ultimately, due to the culmination of constant organizational issues within the Intelligence Community itself, cultivating strategy and organization proved to be a challenge throughout the course of the conflict for the Intelligence Community. In contrast to most scholarly work which articulates that the Intelligence Community understood the complexities of Afghanistan, I instead argue that the Intelligence Community lacked available analytical expertise along with sufficient knowledge regarding Afghanistan. Within the Intelligence Community, there was a small cadre of experts who understood the complexities that accompanied the situation in Afghanistan. This paper is based on published materials from experts within the Intelligence Community, materials published by members of the Intelligence Community, and further, scholarly examinations of Intelligence failures during the U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan.