Abstract:

Ostrom’s Common Pool Resource (CPR) theory posits that small-scale, homogeneous groups are more likely to promote collective actions and achieve sustainable resource utilization through self-organization and self-management. However, this case study shows the failure of a traditional Kazakh community based on kinship to achieve collective action. This article further examines how homogeneity among community members impacts the outcomes of collective actions.

This article employs oral history methodology to explore the relationship between social networks and property rights. Based on two years of fieldwork, using the kinship value to quantify the interaction between community members. The practice of Daiyang in winter among members represents the effectiveness of collective action; the Daimu actions signify the failure. Through quantitative analysis, the study finds that when the herders are immediate relatives, it is easier to promote collective action; however, when herders are non-direct relatives, violations such as Daimu are more likely to be tolerated.

This article offers a new perspective within the institutional economics school by examining the relationship between member heterogeneity and collective action through kinship relationships. It addresses the limitations of CPR theory, which often views communities as homogeneous wholes. The research findings reveal that under the pasture contracting policy and the influence of market forces differentiation has occurred within what was previously considered a homogeneous community. This article provides a more nuanced view of "homogeneity" in CPR theory by showing Kazakh traditional communities' kinship relationships have evolved under market influences.

Note： Daiyang refers to the act of taking care of livestock for group members, which is a reciprocal behavior; Daimu refers to grazing livestock on common pastures for non-Kazakhs in agricultural areas outside the village, making the common (summer) pasture open access, thereby signifying the failure of collective action.