Abstract:

Perceptions of crime and justice are hot spots of contention in contemporary criminology research. Perception is complicated by the fact that participants in morally and/or legally questionable actions can apply obfuscated structures. For example, participants in corrupt transactions use various structures and/or instruments to mitigate moral taboos and/or legislative restrictions. In our study, we test Rossman's theory of obfuscation structures – bundling, brokerage, gift exchange, and pawning – that decrease the moral opprobrium of external audiences and thereby legitimize corrupt transactions. Bundling, when two morally acceptable exchanges support each other to create the appearance of an exchange that may not be morally acceptable. Brokerage, when a third party mediates an exchange between two parties. Gift exchange, the mutual giving of gifts between two parties within a relationship. Pawning, when individuals take on debts and repay them using goods or services they are hesitant to sell directly, serving as a way to obscure the transaction. In our research methodology, we adopt a comprehensive approach that involves two interconnected experimental methods for studying the case of Kazakhstan. First of all, we replicate the Schilke-Rossman vignette experiment, demonstrating how it works in another geographical context. For these purposes, we conducted a pilot experiment involving 200 respondents. Second, we combine qualitative and experimental approaches by conducting focus groups with embedded experiments, inspired by the approach of Boltanski and Thévenot. All this sheds light on various nuances of the perception of crime and justice, and allows us to understand deeply how people perceive corruption and how they justify their perceptions about it.