Abstract:

This paper examines the practice of Komsomol anti-religious spectacles in Kazakhstan from the inception of the New Economic Policy to the turn to violent collectivization. In particular, it explores the differences between anti-Russian Orthodox spectacles like Komsomol Christmas and Easter and anti-Islamic spectacles like Komsomol Kurban Ait and Uraza Ait. Drawing on state and regional archives in Almaty and Semey, I demonstrate that anti-Islamic spectacles were of limited geographical scope and less intentionally provocative than their anti-Russian Orthodox counterparts.

Komsomol anti-Russian Orthodox spectacles in Kazakhstan began in 1922 and included sacrilegious displays such as mock liturgies and the burning of ikons, in addition to acts of violence against clergy. The subversiveness of Komsomol anti-Russian Orthodox activism was rooted in the insider knowledge of the religious tradition within which the Russian Komsomol Komsomol’tsy were reared. Despite significant swings in official encouragement, various iterations of Komsomol Christmas and Komsomol Easter would continue to be practiced in Kazakhstan through the 1920s, which testifies to the development of a self-sustaining anti-religious youth culture amongst Russian Komsomol’tsy. In contrast, Kazakh Komsomol’tsy did not carry out explicitly anti-Islamic spectacles until 1923. These anti-Islamic spectacles were of more limited geographical scope and did not include inflammatory mock religious rituals. Komsomol anti-Islamic holidays would disappear from the record from 1924 until 1929 when Komsomol Kurban Ait was revived as a means to combat the unapproved slaughter of livestock during the first five-year plan. The anti-religious activism of Kazakh Komsomol’tsy was inorganic and overwhelmingly dictated from the top. Unwilling or unable to participate in vanguard actions of cultural transformation, Kazakh youth were relegated to a secondary position within the Komsomol. Reexamining Soviet practices from a ground-level and comparative perspective can deepen our understanding of this critical period of transition in the history of Soviet Kazakhstan and Central Asia.