Abstract:

This paper examines how Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has affected the Kremlin’s influence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus regions. Russia’s invasion has challenged the traditional multi-vectoral foreign policy pursued by some Central Asian and South Caucasian states as they come under pressure to take sides. Russia’s difficulties have created an opportunity for rival actors to fill a rapidly developing vacuum resulting from the diminution of Russian influence. This is particularly noticeable in the case of China but is also evident with Turkey which is seeking an enhanced position in Central Asia and has intensified economic, security and defence cooperation with the regions’ regimes. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has cooled debates with Central Asian countries about joining Kremlin-sponsored organisations, such as the Eurasian Economic Union, which Putin hopes to establish as a rival to the EU.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has substantially altered Russia’s standing in the South Caucasus. It has been transformed from a unipolar region, with Russia dominating, to a more complex bipolar region with the Kremlin having to share influence with Turkey. The 2020 war between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces in Karabakh and the surrounding region provided the Kremlin with an opportunity to extend its influence and military presence in the region. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine tilted the balance further in Azerbaijan’s favour. Russia has had no choice but to acknowledge Turkey’s transformation from peripheral player to regional peer and rival pole of influence. The complex manoeuvrings of the Georgian government since the invasion will also be analysed as will the significance of the EU Commission decision in November 2023 to accept the country as a candidate for EU membership. Finally, Russia’s establishment of a naval base in Abkhazia as a response to setbacks in Crimea will be examined.