Paper abstract:

Politics in most of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) states is characterized as patronal, meaning that the political power is concentrated in the hands of an individual ruler (patron) who grants his personal acquaintances (clients) access to resources in exchange for their loyalty and political support. Scholars agree that the rule of law reforms aimed at building and strengthening effective judicial systems in such societies show limited results. This concerns the constitutional courts which in different forms and shapes exist in all FSU states. This research aims to explain the varying degrees of judicial power in the context of the observed patronal regimes and what triggers patronal regimes to introduce and implement reforms towards or away from stronger constitutional justice mechanisms. Answering these questions informs an understanding of the value of the rule of law institutions for the regimes that are not democratic. The central argument advanced here suggests a curvilinear relationship between judicial power and patronal regime: constitutional courts will have higher levels of judicial power in the weakest and strongest patronal regimes than in patronal regimes of middling strength. Examination of the case studies in three countries of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) validates this proposition.