Paper short abstract:

I argue for a reappraisal of the notion of evidence in human science which recognises the extent to which human physical reality may be an extension of individuals’ consciousness of that reality, their purposive action and judgmental reaction in regard to it. A case-history is made of Nietzsche’s ambiguous breakdown and so-called ‘night-time years’. One retains the aspiration towards scientific objectivity but recognises, too, the objectivity of subjectivity: that for living things there is an individuality to their embodied being-in-the-world which renders the truth about their lives personal.

Paper long abstract:

'We commonly think of the external "physical world" as somehow separate from an internal "mental world"', Gregory Bateson observes; it would be truer to say, however, that '[t]he mental world --the mind, the world of information processing-- is not limited by the skin': there is a 'mental determinism' immanent in the universe of living creatures.

In this talk I argue for a reappraisal of the notion of evidence in human science which recognises the extent to which human physical reality may be an extension of individuals' consciousness of that reality, their purposive action and judgmental reaction in regard to it. There should be an ethical recognition in the notion of evidence: evidence compasses a kind of respect.

The weight of case-history in the talk is borne by Nietzsche's ambiguous breakdown and so-called 'night-time years'. The argument is an instantiation of what Kierkegaard defined as the personal nature of significant knowledge --faith, love-- and its objectivity in our physical experience.

One retains the aspiration towards scientific objectivity but recognises, too, the objectivity of subjectivity: that for living things there is an individuality to their embodied being-in-the-world which renders the truth about their lives personal. The highest aim of epistemology and of morality alike must be to provide testimony of this difficult species of truth.