

UNDERSTANDING OURSELVES AND OUR WORLD FROM THE MULTIPLICITY OF WORLD-VIEWS: PERSPECTIVES IN AFRICAN EPISTEMOLOGICAL RELATIONALITY

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ABSTRACT

The importance of epistemological relationality in understanding ourselves and our world has been the focus of recent attention in global academic scholarship. In times past, this has been monopolized by one or some cultures over others. However, the components of this relationality have not been exhaustively theorized from different philosophical perspectives, allowing specific Western philosophical conceptions to dominate the dimension of discuss in literatures on this subject. The impact of this has been cultural supremacy, racial relegation and deprivation. This research offers a theoretical analysis of the global connection and ontological background that informs various conceptualizations of ourselves and our world from African, Western and Eastern world-views and unloads its implication for a value driven and harmonious coexistence. It aims at broadening this conception in Western and Eastern traditions, while showing what precedes this reflection and highlighting with analysis, the multiple relational process of knowing this African ontological value. This research therefore adopts the hermeneutics and critical analysis methods. It argues that multiplicity of world-views is a reflection of relationality in the unique ways we conceptualize reality from cultural events even though in diverse and informal forms. It concludes that this multiplicity in learning and understanding ourselves and our world forms the rational foundation for a complementary interrelation and mutual respect in the world and Africa in particular.

Key Words: Epistemological, Relationality, Multiplicity, World-view, Africa.

1. INTRODUCTION

The quest to understand our world and ourselves from a reconciliation of the multiplicity of its appearance is of primary importance to recent scholarship. This attempt has been driven by the question can there be unity informed by epistemic relationality or relativism (Macfarlane, 2014:177), (Carter, 2015:38) that crystalizes our commonality within the multiplicity of world-views even in its informal forms? Several scholars in history have argued for and against this position thus polarising ideologies such as absolutism, personalism, objectivism etc., in philosophy, anthropology, history, education to mention but a few. These ideologies engender far reaching implications for contemporary society and scholarship, especially in the various forms of segregation and class distinction used in qualifying 'intelligible', human persons and social standards.

In Marthar Nussbaum (Nussbaum, 1997) comparative understanding, defining which specie of humanity is more special, better and knowledgeable can be traced to the difficulties in doing comparative studies. Such difficulties according to Ronnie Littlejohn include: "descriptive chauvinism (recreating another tradition in the image of one's own), normative skepticism (merely narrating or describing the views of different philosophers and traditions, suspending all judgment about their adequacy), incommensurability (the inability to find the common ground among traditions needed as a basis for comparison), and perennialism (failure to realize that philosophical traditions evolve, that they are not perennial in the sense of being monolithic or static)". (Littlejohn, 2020:1). Crisis of knowledge in human societies are fundamentally products of beliefs and practices. These are not totally borne out of lack of knowledge of the subject of controversy but likely for two main reasons or more such as; 1. The observers have sufficient knowledge of the subject. 2. The observers have sufficient knowledge from two polar schools of thoughts. 3. The observers lack a dint of knowledge of the intentions of their teachers or instructors (whether objective or biased) or these instructors of theirs as well. From this analogy, we can infer that human relation in the community especially in thought and actions are product of a multiplicity of educational processes resulting in distinct perspectives in conceiving our world and understanding ourselves.

This work therefore raises the questions: what makes a thing knowledgeable? Are there certain universal standards and principle for justifying what can be knowledge? Are world-views intelligible in their informal forms? Can there be knowledge in indigenous systems that grant understanding of ourselves and our world in their unique ways? To what extent has epistemological universalism broken the barriers of multiplicity and aided interdependent global learning processes. This work like Thomas khun, (Khun, 1962:54) argues for a Paradigm shift, hence against personal epistemology (Barbara, 2005:240) argues for

epistemological relationality where the possibility of knowledge will shift from formal standards or patterns that relegate others as informal, unintelligent and impossible. It emphasises relativity, complementarity, and all-inclusiveness with the affirmation that all views, standards and processes of belief and learning in our various conceptual schemes are the many ways through which we can have knowledge of reality and understanding of ourselves and our world. This work contributes to discussions in rationalism and empiricism in epistemology, universalism and particularism or traditionalism, unity and diversity in metaphysics pluralism and relativism in cultural studies, relational and personal epistemology in Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKS) (Norma Ruth Arlene Romm 2017:28) Chauvinism in Comparative Studies, inter-religious studies in religion, relativity in quantum mechanics in philosophy of science, intelligibility and un-intelligibility of language and life forms in logical positivist discuss in social epistemology and analytic philosophy among others. As far as the question of the possibility and frame work of knowledge is concerned, this work is not new to scholarship. It is a relevant frame work for global epistemology of learning and meaningful interrelation.

2. CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

2.1 Epistemological Relationality

“Relativism” argues that things are what they are and are epistemologically justified relative to a given framework of assessments such as cultural norms, individual standards and correspondingly, that the truth of claims attributing these properties hold only with reference to such given framework of assessment. Other perspectives have been introduced to define this concept. They include: the covariance, the contrast, and hidden parameter. Relativism is wide in scope due to its very nature hence it can include global and local, strong and weak, amongst others. It was first used in the 19th Century by John Grote in *Exploratio Philosophica* (1865) and later by Wilhelm Traugott Krug, who succeeded Kant in the University of Königsberg. Types of relativism include cultural relativism, conceptual relativism and alethic relativism. Others are moral and epistemological relativism.

From the ancient period between Imhotep, pre-socratic and the medievals, the question of relationality has remained an unresolved controversy. Plato on his assessment of Protagoras thought, injected the first controversial argument on relativism, and so it continued to the post-modern period. Hence, contemporary doors of discuss were opened to the analytic school. This school did not seek to reject metaphysics but to establish a new perspective to understanding the meaning of things with theories like; logical mathematics, logical atomism, *Tractatus-logical philosophicus*, especially Vienna circle logical positivists remarkable a principle of verification, until the philosophical investigations destroyed this positivists doctrine by

showing the unique nature of things as ‘forms of life’ whose vitality can be understood and appreciated through certain rules. This totally re-established against ‘absolutism’, the ‘interconnected’, ‘interwoven’ and ‘interrelated’ harmony in existence and the knowledge that things in their multiplicity can be understood from a relational and complementary approach. However, clarifying with analysis the epistemic possibility of relationality without absolutism, still remained a fundamental problem for scholars in philosophy of language, science, religion, sociology, mathematics and physics.

Epistemological relativism, an offshoot of relativism, forms the foundation for this discussion on relationality. Epistemological relativism is the position that knowledge is valid only relatively to a specific context, society, culture or individual. This is very controversial in the scope of epistemology with reference to the question of knowledge-ability of frameworks. Spring point of epistemological relativism is the fact that the parameters for knowledge claims vary with and are dependent on local conceptual or cultural frameworks and lack universality. Its objectives are an interesting ingredient for the analysis in this study. Epistemological relativism considers relativism about truth, logic, science and social construction. Its traditional supporting arguments include the pyrrhonian Argument, where John Greco (2013, 179), Sankey (2013: 3) Carter (2016) and Markus Seidel (2013, 137) are prominent, the non-neutrality argument that involves Siegel (2011: 205) Rorty’s (1979) Max Kölbel (2003) among others, the incommensurability and Circularity argument that brings views of Wittgenstein, Kuhn, Hacking and Michael Williams (2007: 3-4) to lime light and the new (semantic) assembling MacFarlane’s (2014) Lewis’s (1980) and Kaplan’s (1989). In a sum, it validates knowledge in any given form.

Epistemological relativism has some basic assumptions which have attracted stern criticism as much as made it unique. In Baghramian and Carter, there are three key assumptions underlying epistemic relativism are: (a) it has a relative framework reject belief justified *simpliciter* and affirms justification relative to an epistemic system against objectivity. b) Affirms uniqueness of even incompatible epistemic systems. (c) Rejects possibility superior epistemic system. (Williams 2007:94, Carter 2015&Baghramian and Carter, 2019) In developing his trenchant criticisms of relativism, Paul Boghossian (2006) attributes to the epistemic relativist three fundamental claims: (a) *epistemic non-absolutism*, (b) *epistemic relationism* and (c) *epistemic pluralism* (Boghossian, 2006a) which Carter described as *a replacement* model (Carter 2019:para 10). From this he endorsed the “doctrine of equal validity”, the view that “there are many radically different, incompatible, yet, ‘equally valid’ ways of knowing the world, with science being just

one of them (Boghossian 2006b: 2). Hence either we can chauvinistically maintain that our epistemic system is superior to all or we accept the equal legitimacy of varying epistemic systems. As he puts it:

... we must reform our talk so that we no longer speak simply about what is justified by the evidence, but ...what is justified by the evidence according to the particular epistemic system that we happen to accept,...there are no facts by virtue of which our particular system is more correct than any of the others. Boghossian (2006a: 84)

Epistemological relativism has been criticized as incoherent but this Martin Kusch (2010) has refuted for the reasons suggested to negate its coherency in turn justifies it. The controversial position became heightened with the question of interconnection when Crispin Wright (2008) interestingly identified a striking non-existing connection between relativism and relationality but such will includes an absolute characteristic to the nature of epistemological relationality. In his critique of Boghossian(Wright, 2008:383), it is crystal clear that his grievance is that insisting on the relationist clause is tantamount to insisting that the only way the relativist make sense of frame works is by interpreting their content in an explicitly relational way, so that the explicitly relational truths are themselves candidates for absolute truth. The defense of epistemological relationality from the analytic bent has ensured several classifications such as the New semantic relativist reconciling position of excluded-middle-circular discussion. Most notably among others is Macfarlane who stressed that “philosophically interesting relativism must part ways with the absolutist” (Carter, 2019; para 20) others are the ‘principle of charity’ in David Donaldson, inclusiveness or contextualism in Boghossian’s, moral relativism in Gilbert Harman’s (1975), and Cohen (1988:91), DeRose (1992, 2009) Epistemic relativist interpretations of Quine, with scientific theories can be at odds yet compatible with data even in the broadest possible sense-“logically incompatible and empirically equivalent” (Quine, 1970: 179). Paul Feyerabend’s introduced the “democratic relativism” theory which channeled the view that “different societies may look at the world in different ways and regard different things as acceptable...” (1987: 59/76).

More so, Larry Laudans, have introduced the *underdetermination*, Derrida’s *deconstructionism* (Laudan 1990: 321) and *Theory –ladenness* of Pierry Duhem, Norwood, Russell Hanson, Khun and Feyeraben where Lakatos, Chalmer, Schindler made significant contributions. Consequently, there is no singular structure, method, principle, paradigm or perspective particular to knowing and communicating reality but from the multiple structure or life forms. Hence epistemological relationality is the idea that knowledge in its multiplicity, ontologically communicates one reality but in different life forms, both formal in academic or informal in non-academic, indigenous traditional form as in world view. But what is world-view or world-views?

2.2 WORLD-VIEW AND WORLD-VIEWS

Various concepts have been identified as medium for people's conception of reality. Some have seen it as belief system, paradigm memeplexes mindset, geists, myth, wisdom, but rapidly and most appropriately developed as "a term for an intellectual conception of the universe from the perspective of a human knower"(Naugle, 2002 :59), is world-view or worldviews. With regards to human history and cultural life, it is used differently in different societies and different disciplines, systematically to emphasize particular ontological value and relational unity of its various aspects such as; religion, political, economic and social. It has a rich academic history and deep significance for a people's indigenous traditional knowledge, social disposition and lives decision as it integrates their institutions, knowledge, experience, and intuitions into a coherent framework they can use to make sense of their existence. This like in Khun (1996) is a "paradigm", a "the scientific paradigm" (Khun, 1996:10)

The term world view etymologically has been derived from two German words, *Welt* meaning "World" and *Anschauung* meaning "View" or "Outlook". Put together is *Weltanschauung* used by most English speakers today³ (Oxford Dictionary). The oxford English dictionary defines the word as "a particular philosophy or view of life; a concept of the world held by an individual or a group".⁴ (Oxford Dictionary) here it is conceived as a contemplation of the world or the view of life. In African philosophy, it has been captured in many literatures by scholars like Metuh, Mbiti, Uria, Imafidon, Ukhun, e.t.c., but as '*Irioma re khagbon*' as I mentioned elsewhere (Obinyan, 2012: 28). The first use of the term appeared in Kant's (1724–1804) *Critique of Pure Reason* to simply refer to the sense of perception. (kant, 112, Moscolo, 2014:para 4). Hegel (1770–1831) sees worldview in his characterization of history as the progressive transformation of "absolute" (mind or spirit) over time. For Dilthey (1833–1911) worldview is a tool for countering the "anarchy of philosophical systems" and working toward an *objective* epistemology for the human sciences. Among others are Nietzsche, (1844-1900) Husserl, Heidegger, and notably, Wittgenstein, and Khun. According to Rousseau and Billingham (2018) worldview is how we see and interprets the world in its diversity and complexity. It covers information about the nature of the world and our place in the scheme of things". (Rousseau and Billingham, 2018: 2)

According to Anderson (2017), one invaluable tool for better understanding and engaging with our culture is the concept of worldview and should be understood as follows; a) an overall view of the world. It's not a physical view of the world, but rather a philosophical view, b) an all-encompassing perspective on everything that exists and matters to us... c) play{s} a central and defining role in our lives...d) shape{s}

and inform{s} our experiences of the world around us...e) operate{s} at both the individual level and the societal level...determine{s} people's opinions on matters of ethics and politics... {It} represents {a person's most fundamental beliefs and assumptions about the universe he inhabits". (Anderson, 2017:para 2)

A worldview therefore, consists of a comprehensive set of philosophical presuppositions, beliefs, and values about the nature of the spiritual, physical and social world. From the scientifically model in Dewitt, (2004), philosophical belief systems in Pepper (1942), religious systems in Peterson (2001), and personal and sociocultural belief systems in Fornet-Betancourt, Estermann, & Aerts, (2010). Masolo noted that; "A complete worldview should be composed of least three components: *ontological* assumptions about the nature of what exists, epistemological principles about what and how it is possible to *know*, and *axiological* beliefs about what is good, moral, or valuable (Goldberg, 2009). (Mascolo, 2014: para 2) In his; *Philosophy as Worldview*, Runco (2015) noted that every person has some basic assumptions about the world. Although he carefully hinted that the distinction between *philosophy* and *worldview* is a bit fuzzy, but concluded that "A worldview is a broad perspective on life and the universe. It is indicative of a person's philosophy..." (Runco, 2015:317). From these, the meanings of "world-view" and its significance goes beyond a general view of the world to reveal the complex intellectual phenomenon and the degree of its epistemological influence on the society and its institutions and the general knowledge the society shares of their identity, beliefs and origin.

A worldview or world-views therefore, is fundamentally a person's or societies epistemology of existence in religious, moral, psychological, axiological, aesthetical cognitive orientation. In approach, it reflects an attitude, Ideologies, religion disposition towards certain types of thinking. (John&Tamara,2013:14, Brent, 2013). Its theories can include among others, assessment and comparison, linguistic, terror Management theory, causality and religious theory. Worldviews can be classified under Roland Muller's cultural worldviews (2001), Michael Lind's American political worldviews (2011), James Anderson's evangelical worldview (2017), William Cobern's Common Sense Theory(2000), Runco's mechanistic, organismic and idealist understanding of worldview(2014) and others. Worldview also has several characteristics. In Apostle's view, they include explanation, futurology, value, paraxiology, methodology or action, Epistemology and Etiology (Apostle, 1994:18). There are also functions of worldview as given by many scholar, but let us crystalize Kraft's for the purpose of this study. There are five functions of world view as outlined by Kraft. They are: explanatory, evaluative, psychological, reinforcement, integrating and adaptability. (Kraft, 1979:53 see also D Tuche, 2008:7 and Malham Bou P 2017:3).

3. WORLD-VIEW: CRYSTALIZING ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL RELATIONALITY FROM AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE

3.1 Epistemological Relationality From African Perspective

The various worldviews of people and cultures in the world is an embodiment of the reflective and systematic investigation on the fundamental questions about their environment or the realities around them. These questions confront them as human beings in the world. It borders on reality as a whole: empirical and meta-empirical, which concerns God, spirit, man, other things and the after-life. According to Aristotle, there is a natural quest in all cultures man to discover the inner reality of things both in themselves and as they confront, understand and communicate their various views of the same reality in history. Africa as part of humanity, participates in this search for meaning and coherence. Hence, worldview by virtue of relationality, is simply an expression of the; “African conception or understanding of reality. It is the African’s philosophy which summarizes African metaphysical, physical, ethical, logical, epistemological...and other existential themes”(Obinyan, 2012:28).

The question here is not if Africa in her different cultures communicates one view of the world? According to Echekewebe, P Curtin had argued that the migration of the Bantu people began somewhere in Nigeria and brought them first to Cameroon and Gabon. (A.O Echekewebe1994:30) but it was through trans-Sahara economic or marketing systems they exchanged their various knowledge of reality and discovered their commonalities and similarities. World-view here is the African’s conception of his world and the fundamental implication of this in their collective existential experience in different communities or individual lives around the continent. Maquest put the same ideas across identified the attitude of ‘Africanity’ as totality of cultural features common to the hundreds of societies Sub-Saharan African. (Maquet,1975:54). The onus of the African epistemic relationality is ontological. It buttresses knowledge of the universe as a function of inter-relativity; a unique inter-relativity that does not isolate, reduce or ‘commonize’ in the search for meaningfulness in existence. An ontological and metaphysical characteristic of the African world view which emphasize interconnected and inter-conscious existence regulating action for harmonious coexistence makes this relationship possible. Okolo’s (1981) analysis of “*what it is to be African*”, is reflection of this African ‘relationship episteme’ where nature is not ‘out there’ but a product of a good God to be venerated and not conquered attracting good fortune and blessings, material and spiritual (Okolo, 1981:24).

Affirming African epistemic relationality, Kwasi Wiredu cautioned the African “...not to philosophize in exclusivity since it would be extremely injudicious to try to philosophize in self-imposed isolation from all modern currents of thought” therefore “the African must acquaint himself with the philosophies of all the

peoples of the world, compare, contrast critically assess them and make use of whatever of value he may find in them”(Weiredu, 1980:60). It is from this premise that the African epistemological rationality proceeds to form a conceptualization of reality from interaction with all other worldviews. This interaction exemplifies a better knowledge of the world from the multiplicity of being or forces in the universe and frameworks respectively. This African epistemological relationality can be seen in Senghor’s *Negritude*, (1981) showing the dynamism of being and mysterious interrelative nature of Africans who see the world in terms of themselves (Oguejiofo, 2009:79). Kenneth Kaunda makes explicit what can be echoed as the African epistemological relationality mantra when he noted that where Descartes would say, I think, therefore, I am, we would say, I relate, therefore, I am. Without relationship my being loses meaning and I cease to be. Without relationship I experience trouble, I am confronted with nonbeing. (Kaunda, 1981:238) Epistemological relationality in African conceptual scheme or Worldview is relational. Ogbonnaya, (2014), Willem *Fourie*, (2015), Philippe Bou Malham, (2017), Paddy Musana,(2018)e.t.c., also captures this quality of African worldview.

4. **UNDERSTANDING OURSELVES AND OUR WORLD FROM THE MULTIPLICITY OF WORLD-VIEWS**

Is worldview epistemological? Martin Heidegger averred that wonder does not just mark philosophy but even pervades it. In J.O. Eneh opines philosophy of whatever culture is based on the human nature to wonder about man, his existence and destiny, as well as God and other beings in the universe. (Eneh, 2001:11) Therefore wonder is at the base, the first step to constructing a people’s world view and philosophy- that is, rational or epistemological activity. The second is rising fundamental questions and reflect on these fundamental questions in search of answers is the third step (Mbaegbu, 2004:10.) This is particular to every culture and society and indeed every man. How does wonder justify worldview? As a path to philosophy it is subjective (*cogito* of Descartes), inter-subjective (*dialogues* of Socrates) and objective in mood (searched for the *Urstoff* by Ionians). Thus the composition of worldview is not a random process altogether. It begins from a stage. The first stage is; Cognition- Here the people become conscious of themselves as individuals and their environment and recognize the various units or entities in their environment both animate inanimate, spiritual and physical and the energy within. The second stage is; Dialogue- Here the people share their experiences both good and bad, express their fears, seek for solution, constitute bodies, groups to investigate the needful areas of concern (research) and come up with suggestions (theories) they also test these theories (and when they fail update them with better ones). The last stage is; Tradition-Here a belief system is constructed, this becomes their custom, norms, disposition,

their science, their episteme or worldview to guide, identify, account for them-origin and God or gods or spirits and demons etc., and constitute as well as moderate their institutions.

Amplifying these remarks Imbo (1998) noted that the indigenous cosmologies, the traditional beliefs are the manifestations of philosophy. Unwritten and unsystematised they form an intricate web that guides the people in making sense of their lives. (OluochImbo, 1998:55). So to deny a people's worldview, rationality and logic, is to imply that they lack the ability to reflect and conceptualize their experience and of cause lack humanity. Worldviews as epistemic systems is the Indigenous traditional knowledge. It articulates and critically reflects on the total experience of a people and the various ways in which knowledge about ourselves and the world is communicated hence justified. Ian Hacking on this emphasized that there are many "styles of reasoning," and their Justification is always made in relation to these epistemic systems, which in turn, is a set of standards or criteria of justification. Each of these worldviews has profound implications for people's concept of themselves, morality, institutional regulations etc. This should be considered information to harvest and reflect on, and a raw material for investigation. In Hautamäki, (2020), this is Epistemic viewpoint relativism (Hautamäki, 2020: 191/192). When the Esan conceive the world as '*Agbon*' meaning Life, it is a knowledge derived from the accumulated experiences of the Esan people. When the Igbo and Yoruba call it '*Uwa*' and '*Aye*' they are communication knowledge of the world lacking in other epistemic systems. So also is '*Munde*' in French, '*Mundo*' in Spanish Galician, '*Welt*' in German '*kosmos*' in Greek, Haitian Creole '*Mondyal*', etc, hence to grasp a wholesome knowledge of the world and indeed man, an epistemic relationalist or relativist approach must be introduced.

In a very articulate way worldview springs from a people's deep reflection on experience of reality and it serves as an instrument of control in their religious, moral, social, political lives. It ontologically conveys a deep knowledge of interrelation and complementarity thus forms the foundation for epistemological relationality. Western, Eastern and African philosophy and cultures are embedded in worldview. All three fundamentally communicate the most basic contents of human experience in the world. One of the major differences between the epistemic systems in philosophy for instance, is their approaches to reality which is observable in tenets of their school of thought. African philosophy in its systematicity, approach reality holistically hence it sees reality a fundamental mystical network of interrelate "we" as expressed in J Mbitis "I am because we are"(Obinyan, 2012;1) in Okolo's "African is a being-with"(1993:4). Eastern world view reality is not a separated whole, but all inclusive This we can find in Conficius, XunZi, Laotzu

etc.,. Western philosophy emphasise two views of reality individuality or independent entities like the Cartesian dualism and communality in Thomas Aquinas, Emanuel Levinas, Martin Buber etc. But, together, these conceptions are different epistemic perspectives of humanity and the world.

Our view of the world both formal and informal is something generated from our empirical conditions of life and experience handed down from one generation to another. They are also scientific, integrating the achievement of traditional culture, ancient civilization and modern science concerning God, nature, society and humanity itself. They all communicate the principle of regulations inherent in societies and the vital relationship that exist between man and the universe and man and social groups in the society. They compose of ontological, epistemological and axiological components. They intersect rather than coincide hence as Jude noted, they are different views of the same reality (Jude, 2004: 78-79). Have we learnt anything from those we refer to as early men? Where they at any time scientific? Are their actions intelligibly useful for today's stability and advancement? If we have, can there be knowledge in indigenous knowledge systems? Have we learnt from the relativity of our worldviews? Choosing an epistemic system is a question of point of view and subject of discussion. Although there are no neutral criteria for justifying knowledge, they can still be assessed and compared in terms of different objectives and interests through epistemic relationality.

5. CONCLUSION

From the aforementioned, this research has attempted to offer a theoretical analysis of the global connection and ontological background that informs various conceptualizations of ourselves and our world from African, Western and Eastern world-views while also showing the implication namely for a value driven and harmonious coexistence. With the hermeneutics and critical analysis methods, this study has crystalized the vitality of epistemological relationality from relativism, for justifying that the knowledge in indigenous systems are together collective knowledge of ourselves and the world. This holistic view of rationalizing about reality is important for a fast globalizing world where the crisis of absolute standard is begging for pluralistic, complimentary and inclusive absolution. The United Nations congress, the ECOWAS and many other world summits are steps already in this direction but more need to be done in the educational and in defining learning processes in schools (from primary to university) and re-examining what is formal and what should be included as formal is it the structure of the class room, the teacher and his/her qualification, the awarded degrees? what standard determines it an what justifies its exclusion? In Chinua Achebe's *Things Fall Apart* and particularly Camara Laye's *The African Child*, an example can

be made. In *'The African Child'*, between the boy who goes to the Western school and those the writer mentioned in his stylistic description of the village, the people in the age grade systems, the schooling of a male child in the hands of grandfather, uncle, father and other men and a female child in the hands of grandmother, aunties, mother and other women e.t.c was there any form of education taking place? How do we categorise it?

As a creative and rational inquiry, worldview understand, clarify, and explain every aspect of people's experience expressed in myths, symbols, cultural and linguistics institutions, in verbal *depositum*, songs/music and dance, names they give to children, things and places and recently in writing in their indigenous culture and institutions hence a unique epistemological system in its own right. African worldview is intelligible not just in the manner of expression of thought and persons involved but in the content and nature of the thought itself and in the method of enquiry employed. World view as a foundation for philosophy in its academic meaning is according to Okolo, "a second order activity". Though it has been relegated to the background of ethnography or ethno-philosophy and as philosophy only in the loose sense, but the fact that they stand as raw materials for formal and academic philosophy after sharpening justifies them as epistemological materials. These materials for Okere can serve as a *philosophemena* that is, as a raw material for philosophizing. They are present in every culture beaming knowledge of reality in unique ways and though in diverse and informal forms, people conceptualize reality from them in cultural events-marriage, childbirth, burial, prayers/rituals and sacrifices, farming, herding of animal, hunting, war, even in stories under the moon light and so on. From these multiple materials of learning and understanding ourselves and our world in various societies, we can "chisels" out a philosophy for indigenous learning framework and justify participant as educated through a relational learning process and form a rational foundation for a complementary interrelation and mutual respect in the world and Africa in particular for "it is the education which gives man a clear and conscious view of his own opinions and judgment ... a truth in developing them, an eloquence in expressing them and a force in urging them". (Newman, 1915: 171)

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